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Abstract 
Software-defined networking (SDN) is a communication paradigm that promotes 
network flexibility and programmability by separating the control plane from the data 
plane. SDN consolidates the logic of network devices into a single entity known as the 
controller. SDN raises significant security challenges related to its architecture and 
associated characteristics such as programmability and centralisation. Notably, security 
flaws pose a risk to controller integrity, confidentiality and availability. 
The SDN model introduces separation of the forwarding and control planes. It detaches 
the control logic from switching and routing devices, forming a central plane or network 
controller that facilitates communications between applications and devices. The 
architecture enhances network resilience, simplifies management procedures and 
supports network policy enforcement. However, it is vulnerable to new attack vectors 
that can target the controller. Current security solutions rely on traditional measures 
such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems (IDS). An IDS can use two different 
approaches: signature-based or anomaly-based detection. The signature-based approach 
is incapable of detecting zero-day attacks, while anomaly-based detection has high 
false-positive and false-negative alarm rates. Inaccuracies related to false-positive 
attacks may have significant consequences, specifically from threats that target the 
controller. Thus, improving the accuracy of the IDS will enhance controller security 
and, subsequently, SDN security. 
A centralised network entity that controls the entire network is a primary target for 
intruders. The controller is located at a central point between the applications and the 
data plane and has two interfaces for plane communications, known as northbound and 
southbound, respectively. Communications between the controller, the application and 
data planes are prone to various types of attacks, such as eavesdropping and tampering. 
The controller software is vulnerable to attacks such as buffer and stack overflow, 
which enable remote code execution that can result in attackers taking control of the 
entire network. Additionally, traditional network attacks are more destructive. 
This thesis introduces a threat detection approach aimed at improving the accuracy and 
efficiency of the IDS, which is essential for controller security. To evaluate the 
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effectiveness of the proposed framework, an empirical study of SDN controller security 
was conducted to identify, formalise and quantify security concerns related to SDN 
architecture. The study explored the threats related to SDN architecture, specifically 
threats originating from the existence of the control plane. 
The framework comprises two stages, involving the use of deep learning (DL) 
algorithms and clustering algorithms, respectively. DL algorithms were used to reduce 
the dimensionality of inputs, which were forwarded to clustering algorithms in the 
second stage. Features were compressed to a single value, simplifying and improving 
the performance of the clustering algorithm. Rather than using the output of the neural 
network, the framework presented a unique technique for dimensionality reduction that 
used a single value—reconstruction error—for the entire input record. The use of a DL 
algorithm in the pre-training stage contributed to solving the problem of dimensionality 
related to k-means clustering. Using unsupervised algorithms facilitated the discovery of 
new attacks. 
Further, this study compares generative energy-based models (restricted Boltzmann 
machines) with non-probabilistic models (autoencoders). The study implements 
TensorFlow in four scenarios. Simulation results were statistically analysed using a 
confusion matrix, which was evaluated and compared with similar related works. 
The proposed framework, which was adapted from existing similar approaches, resulted 
in promising outcomes and may provide a robust prospect for deployment in modern 
threat detection systems in SDN. The framework was implemented using TensorFlow 
and was benchmarked to the KDD99 dataset. Simulation results showed that the use of 
the DL algorithm to reduce dimensionality significantly improved detection accuracy 
and reduced false-positive and false-negative alarm rates. Extensive simulation studies 
on benchmark tasks demonstrated that the proposed framework consistently 
outperforms all competing approaches. This improvement is a further step towards the 
development of a reliable IDS to enhance the security of SDN controllers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Networking is the enabling technology for an enormous number of communication 
applications, including the internet, the Internet of Things (IoT) and cloud computing. 
The growth of applications has necessitated expansion of data communication 
infrastructure. Therefore, additional flexibility in management and interoperability is 
required. However, traditional networks are based on a rigid architecture that does not 
fully satisfy the requirements of emerging technologies [1]-[3]. Software-defined 
networking (SDN) is a novel networking model that provides the features required for 
supporting emerging networking technologies [1], [4]. Figure 1.1 depicts the 
architecture of SDN. The SDN model proposes the separation of the forwarding and 
control planes by aggregating and abstracting a device’s logic into a new central entity 
called the network controller [4], [5]. 
The controller concept is analogous to operating systems, which are responsible for 
interactions between applications and devices. The existence of controller entity boosts 
programmability, enabling developers to code applications for many purposes, 
including network management, load balancing and network monitoring. The 
architecture enhances network resilience, simplifies management procedures and 
supports network policy enforcement [1], [6]. Additionally, the new features of SDN 
enhance security by facilitating several security measures such as threat detection and 
prevention [7]. 
However, SDN architecture design suffers from significant security flaws [1], [8]. 
Paradoxically, the characteristics of SDN that make it a promising substitute for 
conventional networks also present security sever challenges. A centralised network 
entity that has control over the entire network is a valuable target for network intruders. 
The controller is located at a central point between applications and the data planes, 
with both northbound and southbound communications being vulnerable to various 
types of attacks [8]. The controller software is prone to vulnerabilities such as buffer 
and stack overflow. Hence, providing security measures to protect the controller itself is 
crucial to fully unleash the capabilities of the new model. 
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Figure 1.1. SDN architecture [4]. 
For decades, conventional networks have employed firewalls and intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) as the standard security solutions to deter and mitigate various network 
threats. However, innovative solutions are required for the unprecedented security 
threats emerging from recent advances in internetworking, such as the IoT, SDN and 
grid computing. 
IDSs adopt either signature-based or anomaly-based detection approaches to identify 
threats [9]. Signature-based detection is limited in its ability to recognise attacks that do 
not exist in the IDS threats profile. However, anomaly-based detection is more 
problematic than signature-based detection because of its precision deficiencies [10]. 
Anomaly-based detection techniques are classified into two categories: statistical and 
machine learning [11], [12]. The latter uses algorithms such as support vector machines 
(SVMs) neural networks and principal components analysis (PCA), all of which fail to 
provide high detection accuracy [11], [13]. Recent achievements in machine learning, 
advances explicitly in training deep learning (DL) neural networks are promising [14], 
[15]; however, few studies have investigated the applicability of DL for detecting 
network anomalies. 
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DL neural network architecture is multi-layered, with hidden layers between the input 
and output layers. The first layer represents network input (data features) and the final 
layer represents network output. Even though DL neural networks have long existed 
[16], they have been unable to train the network for various reasons, including the 
vanishing gradient descent in backpropagation, unsatisfactory generalisation and the 
need for intensive computation power. 
In 2006, a pre-training step using restricted Boltzmann machines (RBM) [14] advanced 
DL, leading to the development of innovative algorithms such as linear rectifier units 
rather than sigmoid functions and dropout to solve generalisation problems [15]. These 
algorithms can be divided into two categories: supervised and unsupervised machine 
learning. 
1.2 Motivations 
Controller security is crucial for the security of the entire SDN architecture [7], [8]. 
Several security solutions have been proposed for securing the controller, including 
standard security measures such as firewalls and IDS. However, controller security 
remains a significant concern, curbing the potential of SDN capabilities [1], [7], [8], 
[17], [18]. 
IDSs have been deployed in traditional networks to enhance network security for 
decades [9], [11]. Both IDS approaches—signature-based and anomaly-based 
detection—have limitations [11]. While signature-based detection is unable to detect 
zero-day attacks, anomaly detection can theoretically detect unprecedented threats. 
However, it suffers from low detection accuracy. The limitations of anomaly detection 
have significant consequences for the deployment of SDN. For instance, in the 
traditional network, damage resulting from an attack affects only a set of network nodes 
with limited consequences, while in an SDN network, a compromised controller may 
lead to the collapse of the entire network. Traditional network-distributed architecture 
can tolerate a margin of IDS inaccuracy (e.g. a false negative). However, the cost of a 
false-negative alarm in SDN may be catastrophic to the network, particularly from 
attacks targeting the controller. Hence, improvements to current IDS approaches are 
essential to boost SDN controller security. 
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Table 1.1 provides a comparison of the two conventional detection methods, with each 
method having its advantages and disadvantages. A significant drawback of the 
signature-based method is its inability to detect new attacks because of its reliance on a 
database of known threats. In contrast, anomaly-based detection has a higher false-
positive alarm rate because of accuracy limitations in the underlying detection 
algorithms, leading to the possible detection of threats in the absence of malicious 
activity. 
Table 1.1. Anomaly-Based vs. Signature-Based Intrusion Detection Systems 
 Anomaly-based Signature-based 
Performance  Medium High 
Protection against zero-day attacks High Low 
False-positive alarms High Low 
False negatives High Medium 
Configuration Low High 
Anomaly-based detection systems utilise various techniques, such as statistical and 
machine learning. Recent advances in machine learning have led to the need to evaluate 
new machine learning algorithms in network anomaly-based detection. 
Several intrusion detection applications have been developed to detect malicious 
activities in SDN networks. For example, the OpenDaylight (ODL) controller uses the 
Defense4All application to detect and mitigate distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attacks [19], [20]. Figure 1.2 depicts the deployment of Defense4All application at the 
ODL. However, the application does not protect the controller itself; rather, it deploys a 
set of rules to protect the network at its edges. In the event of malicious activity, the 
Defense4All application requests network information from the controller and acts via 
its attack mitigation module. Security limitations of this application include the 
following: 
 The application must first communicate with the controller to gather statistics 
and raw data used by the IDS to decide whether an activity is malicious. 
Consequently, the controller is exposed to the threat prior to the decision being 
made. 
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 The controller’s location in the architecture makes it vulnerable to new types of 
attacks that require novel mechanisms, such as those that ensure the security of 
communications between the controller and the IDS. 
 Controller software may be prone to traditional software vulnerabilities, which 
require advanced detection techniques such as deep packet inspection. 
 
Figure 1.2. OpenDaylight Defense4All application [19]. 
1.3 Research Methodology 
The research goal is to improve the efficiency of IDS capabilities for threat detection to 
enhance the security of the SDN controller and reduce concerns related to security 
threats to SDN architecture. The research was divided into three phases: security threat 
analysis, IDS design and implementation and performance analysis and evaluation. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the research stages. In the first phase—SDN security analysis—the 
new networking architecture is introduced. The controller is a significant point of 
attraction for new threats. Identifying the threat list is a starting point for proposing 
appropriate security solutions. In [8], a threat vector for SDN is defined and seven 
threats are listed, with three being exclusive to the SDN model. Notably, SDN-specific 
threats originate from the controller: 
 Attacks on control plane communications 
 Attacks on controller vulnerabilities 
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 Attacks on the controller originating from the application layer. 
The first stage of the study involved the analysis of mentioned threats. There are two 
main approaches to security analysis: system-oriented and attack-oriented. For research 
comprehensiveness and consistency, a method from each approach was selected. 
STRIDE is a system-oriented threat modelling method [21] that models dataflow 
diagrams (DFDs) of the system under analysis. The main elements of the model are data 
flow, data stores, processors, interactors and trust boundaries. DFD components were 
examined against the set of attacks specified by STRIDE: spoofing, tampering, 
repudiation, information gathering, denial of service and elevation of privilege. 
Attack trees are a formal, attack-oriented approach to defining possible attacks against 
the system [22]. The attack tree starts with a root node denoting the attack goal, and 
various tree leaves specify the means of reaching the node. Logical AND/OR operators 
are used to aggregating the leaves. The attack tree analysis is supported by tools such as 
Security and Isograph. The goal of the second stage was to simulate attacks as proof of 
concept to provide a deeper understanding of threats. 
Additionally, the analysis phase provided a simulation of various attacks derived from 
the previous analysis phase. The simulation was conducted using an SDN simulator 
integrated with a real controller (ODL). The main goal of this stage was to provide a 
more profound proof of concept of various threats and their impacts on network assets. 
In the solution domain, IDSs are used as security solutions in traditional networks; 
however, their limitations need to be addressed in SDN deployment. In the second 
phase, the detection system was designed and implemented. The new architecture and 
challenges brought by SDN have increased the need to investigate various architectures 
of IDSs in the SDN controller. The goal of this phase was to propose a framework that 
delivers highly accurate detection functionalities to protect the controller. This phase 
was divided into three stages. The first stage provided the theoretical design principals 
for the framework, main components and decision boundaries. Six design principles 
based on the formalised definition of the problem were identified. In the second stage, 
an implementation based on the design principles was constructed as a proof of concept. 
The final stage in this phase involved the training and execution of the models. The 
final phase was a simulation and evaluation of the proposed framework with a focus on 
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performance metrics. During the simulations, the dataset was normalised and fed to the 
system before results were collected, recorded and analysed. For the analysis, confusion 
matrices, a common technique for classification and clustering analyses, were used to 
compare results with related works. In the final step, similar works were evaluated, and 
their contributions were highlighted. 
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Figure 1.3. Research methodology. 
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1.4 Research Questions and Scope 
This research is aimed at enhancing SDN controller security. The research objectives 
gave rise to the following questions: 
The primary research question is: How may an efficient threat detection framework be 
designed that will improve the detection accuracy of IDS and, hence, the security of 
SDN? 
The following sub-questions were derived from the primary research question: 
 What are the main security threats to the controller? How are these threats 
different from those in traditional networking models? 
 How is it possible to improve the performance of IDS to provide reliable 
security measures to the SDN controller? 
 How can recent advances in machine learning help improve the detection 
accuracy of IDSs? 
 How can unsupervised DL be used in network anomaly detection? 
 How can dimensionality reduction be achieved using unsupervised DL? 
 What is the best deployment of the proposed framework in SDN architecture? 
1.5 Contributions 
This thesis enhances the security of the SDN model by improving the efficiency of 
current security solutions. This thesis proposes a novel detection framework based on 
unsupervised DL algorithms for threat detection. 
The study explored the potential of DL for revealing network threats by utilising 
unsupervised DL algorithms. The research examined the ability of DL to detect 
anomalies through evaluation of generative energy-based models (RBMs) and non-
probabilistic algorithms (autoencoders). Following this, an in-depth analysis of DL 
algorithms was conducted, with results showing promising detection accuracy. 
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of SDN controller security to identify, 
formalise and quantify security concerns related to the new model. The study explored 
threats related to SDN architecture, specifically those originating from the controller 
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plane. The study analysed controller security over three stages. The first stage defined 
potential threats based on a review of the literature. The second stage demonstrated and 
modelled threats using a STRIDE analysis. Additionally, an in-depth attacks-oriented 
analysis was developed using several attack trees. The third stage introduced an 
experiment to reveal threats and consequences. The study provides a comprehensive 
understanding of the problem by specifying the security flaws of SDN. 
The framework consisted of two phases: a DL algorithm and a clustering algorithm 
using either k-means or mean shift clustering. The DL algorithm represented the pre-
training phase, which simplified the input to the clustering algorithm. The framework 
employed dimensionality reduction of the input data, compressing the dimensions of the 
input data to a single value to simplify and improve the performance of the clustering 
algorithm in the second phase. 
The study improved the performance of the k-means algorithm. The k-means relies on 
calculating the distance between different samples—an increase in the number of 
samples results in a dramatic decrease in distance between them. Hence, the use of the 
DL algorithm in the pre-training phase reduced the problem of dimensionality related to 
k-means. The framework solved this problem by reducing the number of inputs based 
on critical procedures in the autoencoder and RBM, generating more straightforward 
inputs to the k-means. 
The framework was based on two unsupervised algorithms, which have the ability to 
find patterns in data with no previous labelling, enabling the detection of zero-day 
attacks. The framework presents a unique method of dimensionality reduction. Instead 
of using the output of the neural network from either the RBM or the autoencoder, the 
framework used a single value—the difference between the input and the output—for 
the entire input record. 
The proposed framework design was implemented using Tensorflow [23]. Accordingly, 
a simulation of several scenarios was conducted using the KDD99 network dataset [24]. 
Following various executions over several testing cycles, the data were collected and 
statistically analysed. A systematic analysis was conducted using confusion matrices to 
evaluate results against other related works. The simulation showed a significant 
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accuracy of ≈99% from the integration of the autoencoder with the k-means clustering 
algorithm. 
1.6 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 2 presents the background, applications, 
networking environments, solutions and challenges of SDN. The first section introduces 
the limitations of the current networking model and the motivation for a novel model to 
handle such limitations. Section 2 introduces the model architecture, the three planes of 
the model and, given that this thesis focuses on security flaws related to the controller, a 
broader discussion of the control plane. This section provides a comprehensive 
anatomical view of one of the most renowned SDN controllers, ODL, which was also 
used in the security attack simulation. Additionally, this section discusses the OpenFlow 
protocol, which is the dominant southbound protocol in SDN architecture. Section 3 
explores three applications of SDN, including traffic engineering, network virtualisation 
and network monitoring and measurements. It discusses the current challenges of each 
of these applications and how characteristics of SDN such as centralisation and global 
view are expected to overcome the limitations of traditional networks in such 
applications. Additionally, this section presents several software solutions for each 
category. Section 4 introduces new emerging networking environments in which SDN 
integration enhances communications and solves problems such as management 
complexity and network abstraction. This section discusses the integration of SDN in 
IoT, cloud computing, data centres and wireless networks, including cellular and fifth 
generation (5G) networks. For each technology, we discuss the challenges and 
contributions of SDN. Additionally, we provide examples of SDN platforms and 
application solutions for each area. Section 5 presents the current challenges and 
limitations of SDN, which are categorised into four classes: architecture design, 
application plane, control plane and data plane. 
Chapter 3 presents an in-depth analysis and simulation of SDN security threats, a 
significant flaw in SDN architecture. The chapter outlines SDN security issues, 
including structural security flaws and how the SDN model may be used to enhance 
security. The first section presents several security applications for SDN, including 
policy enforcement and verification, threat detection and response. Additionally, it 
provides a survey of SDN security tools. The next section discusses the security flaws 
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of the SDN model, specifically controller threats. Section 4 presents an analysis of SDN 
security using two approaches—STRIDE and attack trees—to identify security threats 
and show how they may be executed. Section 5 describes the experimental study 
conducted to demonstrate attacks against the SDN controller. 
Chapter 4 presents the solution domain. The thesis focuses on enhancing the security of 
SDN through intrusion detection. This chapter introduces the solution methodology, 
which is machine learning. The first section discusses network intrusion detection 
techniques and compares different approaches such as signature-based and anomaly-
based detection. The second section explores anomaly-based detection methods, 
including statistical and machine learning. Section 3 introduces the DL algorithms, 
focusing on unsupervised DL algorithms, autoencoders and RBMs. Section 4 discusses 
the opportunities for using DL for anomaly detection. 
Chapter 5 presents the proposed detection framework. The first section introduces the 
components of the framework, which consists of two phases. The first phase uses an 
unsupervised DL algorithm, and the second phase uses a simple clustering algorithm. 
Section 2 depicts the framework workflow and the framework algorithm in pseudocode. 
Additionally, a detailed description of the different steps is included. Section 3 outlines 
the five design principles of the framework, which include dimensionality reduction, 
decision boundaries, clustering and curse of dimensionality, network traffic features, the 
number of hidden layers and neurons and the assumptions required for framework 
applicability. Section 4 describes the framework in action—the theoretical background 
for the algorithms. Section 5 describes the integration of the framework in an SDN 
model. Section 6 discusses the advantages of the framework. 
Chapter 6 provides the implementation, simulation and evaluation of the proposed 
framework. The first section is an overview of the simulation. The second section 
proposes four different scenarios for the simulation based on different algorithms in the 
first and second phases of the framework. The third section presents an analysis and 
rationale for the dataset, and the different software libraries and tools used in the 
simulation. The fourth section presents the implementations of the framework, 
including the implementation of two unsupervised DL algorithms—an autoencoder and 
an RBM—and two clustering algorithms—k-means and mean shift. Following 
implementation, the section also demonstrates how the system was executed, including 
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training and testing. The fifth section shows the results of several executions on the 
dataset. Additionally, this section provides an in-depth analysis of the results using 
confusion matrices. Section 6 presents an evaluation of the framework results compared 
with other similar proposed frameworks. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis, briefly describing the problem of the SDN controller 
security flaws, the research contribution, which mainly focuses on frameworks for 
anomaly-based detection in SDN networks, and a proof of concept implementation for 
the framework towards solving the problem. It highlights the thesis contributions, lists 
research limitations and suggests directions for future work.  
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Chapter 2: Software-Defined Networks 
SDN has introduced a revolutionary communications model through the decoupling of 
the control and forwarding planes and the relocation of the network logic to a new layer 
known as the network controller. Features of this model include centralisation and 
network programmability, which pave the way for various networking solutions and 
innovations. As an emerging technology, SDN provides several opportunities and 
challenges. This chapter discusses the novel networking model of SDN, including its 
major technological drivers, motivations, components and challenges. 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to present a comprehensive review of SDN, 
including its design, models and characteristics, its role as enabling technology in 
several environments and its applications and limitations. 
The chapter explores SDN architecture and discusses the three planes of the SDN 
model: the application, controller and physical planes. It mainly focuses on the 
responsibilities and essential services offered by the controller, a new plane introduced 
by SDN, and discusses several issues related to it, including scalability, availability and 
interoperability. Given that the controller is critical for SDN security, the chapter 
provides a more in-depth anatomical view of its components and its various roles, using 
ODL as the model, and discusses the applications of SDN in areas such as traffic 
engineering, network monitoring and virtualisation. For each application domain, the 
chapter provides an in-depth discussion of the enabling features of SDN that help to 
solve current problems with conventional networks. 
Additionally, SDN deployment in various networking environments is introduced and 
SDN challenges for each plane are highlighted. SDN security challenges are discussed 
in the following chapter. 
2.1 Introduction 
The traditional data communication model is composed of three planes: management, 
control and data planes. The management plane provides services to monitor and 
configure the network, while the control plane generates the data required to establish 
forwarding tables on physical devices. Subsequently, the forwarding plane directs 
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packets to ingress and egress ports based on the tables. In the traditional network model, 
both the control and forwarding planes are tightly coupled to the same device (e.g. a 
switch or a router). This model is efficient from a performance perspective. However, as 
the complexity of networks has increased, the need to adopt a new architecture has 
emerged [1]. 
Network management comprises various activities, including management of faults, 
configuration, performance, security, inventory and accounting. Each network includes 
several interoperating devices, each having its own configuration firmware, from 
different vendors. To perform management activities or to add or remove devices in the 
network, the network administrator must obtain different software packages or make 
changes to various devices, which increases the complexity of management [1], [3], 
[25], [26]. For complex networking environments such as data centres, management 
activities become even more complicated. A single misconfiguration can lead to 
unexpected policy violations [2]. 
Additionally, given the rigid structure of the network, scaling the network vertically (by 
increasing the capacity of current resources) or horizontally (by adding new resources) 
is a complicated procedure. This may be addressed using the process of abstraction. For 
example, if firmware installed on different devices is abstracted to a single software, 
this will facilitate integration and configuration of network devices. Hence, the concept 
of separating the logic from the hardware is key to tackling the rigid and static structure 
of traditional networks. The evolution of SDN is similar to that of distributed and 
personal computing. 
The SDN model consists of three planes known as the forwarding, control and 
application planes. SDN architecture separates the control plane from the forwarding 
plane introducing an independent plane known as the controller or the network 
operating system (NOS) The forwarding plane comprises devices such as switches, 
routers and middleboxes, which switch data flow but do not have the logic required to 
populate the forwarding tables [5],[27], [28]. The network intelligence resides in the 
controller, which abstracts devices and provides services such as network state and 
topology information. Additionally, the controller provides a northbound application 
program interface (API) to communicate with applications and a southbound API to 
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communicate with forwarding devices. OpenFlow is the dominant southbound interface 
used in SDN [29]. 
The application plane lies on the top of the SDN model stack. Programmability is a 
fundamental concept of the SDN paradigm in which applications communicate with 
physical devices. Programmability provides opportunities for innovation for an 
enormous number of network applications, including monitoring, traffic engineering, 
security and cloud applications [30], [31]. Centralisation is a distinctive feature of the 
SDN architecture, providing a global view of the entire network and facilitating 
management and monitoring processes. Additionally, it reduces errors in configuration 
and deployment of network policies. Centralisation also improves flexibility—for 
instance, a pool of devices from various vendors may be deployed and abstracted in the 
same network [32]. 
2.2 Software-Defined Network Architecture 
Conventional networks are divided into three planes, namely the management, control 
and forwarding layers. The management plane provides services to monitor and 
configure the network. The control plane generates the data required to establish 
forwarding tables, which, in turn, are used by the forwarding plane to direct packets to 
ingress and egress ports. In traditional network models, both the control and forward 
planes are tightly coupled within a single device (e.g. switch or router). This model is 
efficient from a performance perspective. However, as the complexity of networks has 
increased, the need to develop a new architecture has emerged. 
Figure 2.1 shows the three layers of SDN. The essence of SDN architecture is the 
separation of the control and forwarding planes. The separation draws the device’s logic 
(software), leaving the network devices as forwarding devices only. These devices do 
not have the capability to decide on forwarding requirements. 
The network control plane is an independent entity known as the network controller or 
NOS. The forwarding layer, on the other hand, comprises of network devices such as 
switches, routers and middleboxes, which do not have their own logic. Network 
intelligence resides in the controller or NOS, which abstracts the devices and provides 
services such as network state and topology information services. Additionally, the 
controller provides a northbound API to communicate with the application layer and a 
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southbound API to communicate with the forwarding layer devices. OpenFlow is the 
dominant southbound protocol in the SDN model [1], [3]. 
The application layer, which lies at the top of the SDN stack, introduces network 
programmability—the ability to communicate with the network’s underlying devices—
which is a fundamental concept in SDN. Programmability provides opportunities for 
network innovation for an enormous number of network applications, including network 
monitoring, traffic engineering, security and cloud applications. 
Centralised control enables a global view of the network, which facilitates management 
and monitoring processes. Additionally, it reduces errors in configuration and 
deployment of network policies and improves flexibility—for instance; a pool of 
devices from various vendors may be deployed and abstracted within the same network. 
 
Figure 2.1. SDN architecture. 
2.2.1 Software-Defined Network Controller 
The controller, or the NOS, abstract devices and provides the resources required to 
program low-level forwarding devices. The controller provides services such as network 
state and topology information. Additionally, the controller provides a northbound API, 
which facilitates communication with applications, and a southbound API, which 
provides accessibility to forwarding devices. OpenFlow is the de facto SDN southbound 
protocol [4], [27]. The application plane resides at the top of the SDN model stack. 
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Network programmability is a privilege primarily achieved by the SDN model in which 
applications in the top plane can access physical devices through the controller. 
Programmability facilitates and accelerates innovation of an enormous number of 
network applications, including monitoring, traffic engineering, security and cloud 
applications. Centralisation is an essential characteristic of the SDN architecture. The 
central entity is the controller, which provides a global view of the entire network and 
facilitates management and policy enforcement. Additionally, it decreases faults in 
configuration and deployment of network policies. Centralisation enhances network 
resilience and interoperability—for example, multiple devices from various industries 
may be integrated and abstracted in one network. 
The SDN controller consists of the following elements: 
 Basic network services: These are the core functions of SDN controllers and 
include topology, device events, status managers, shortest path forwarding and 
underlying security mechanisms. 
 Service abstraction layer (SAL): Orchestrates the southbound API (e.g. plug-in 
management). 
 Southbound API: Typically, the southbound API refers to the OpenFlow 
protocol. However, SDN supports the integration of various protocols, such as 
Forwarding and Control Element Separation and Open vSwitch Database 
Management Protocol, in the southbound API. 
 East/westbound API: Connects controllers within the distributed architecture. 
 Northbound API: Facilitates communication between applications and lower 
devices via the controller. 
Traditional network hardware has been managed by proprietary software such as the 
Cisco Internetworking Operating System. The core component of the control plane is 
the NOS, which provides the basic functionality for applications to access and manage 
devices in the physical plane. Similar to other generic operating systems (e.g. Windows 
and Linux), the NOS provides mechanisms to manage and abstract hardware resources. 
Based on its architecture, the NOS can be classified into two categories—centralised or 
distributed. In a centralised architecture, the NOS is installed on a single computing 
device. While this is efficient from a performance perspective, it has limitations in 
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scalability and availability (a single point of failure) [1], [33]. Trema [34], Ryu [35], 
Floodlight [36], Meridian [37] and Beacon [38] are all classified as centralised NOSs, 
with support for multithreading and concurrency to achieve high throughputs. 
In a distributed deployment, the NOS is installed onto several nodes to support 
scalability and high availability requirements for large data centres or large networks. 
These nodes can be in a single cluster or distributed over several clusters that are 
physically separated. Clusters or nodes are designed on the basis of peer-to-peer or 
hierarchal architectures [1]. Distributed architecture improves fault tolerance and high 
availability—for example, if there is a failure or security breach in a portion of the 
NOS, network administrators have more options for recovery (e.g. isolation). Several 
controllers, including Onix [39] and ONOS [40], adopt distributed architecture. 
However, a distributed architecture is also related to issues such as consistency and 
latency. Given that the controller is distributed over several nodes, each node must 
retain the latest data view (e.g. network topology or switch status). Additionally, nodes 
or clusters must communicate across the network, causing latency [7]. 
2.2.2 Controller Anatomy: OpenDaylight 
ODL is a modular open-source controller project under the Linux Foundation. It has 
wide support from the industry, including Cisco, IBM, Microsoft and Huawei, and more 
than 1,000 developers. Figure 2 shows ODL’s Lithium version controller components. 
The controller layer provides basic network services such as network topology, network 
status and switch manager. 
Representational state transfer (REST) API represents a northbound API to facilitate 
communication between the controller and the uppermost layers. REST API uses non-
persistent connections. Southbound APIs include OpenFlow and protocol plug-ins that 
interface with devices. The controller implements core services, including topology, 
statistics and switch management, host tracking and Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) 
handling. Further, the controller provides services for standard protocols. The SAL 
allows the controller to support various protocols such as OpenFlow, Simple Network 
Management Protocol and Border Gateway Protocol in the southbound API.
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Figure 2.2. OpenDayLight controller architecture [19]. 
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ODL provides a plug-in to support the Open vSwitch Database Management Protocol 
[41], which is a configuration management protocol designated to the SDN virtual 
switch (vSwitch) [42]. Additionally, ODL provides a network configuration 
(NETCONF) plug-in to support configuration installation and deletion on devices in the 
forwarding plane [43]. ODL supports standard routing and network management 
protocols such as the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [44] and the Simple Network 
Management Protocol (SNMP) [45] and provides a plug-in for the Path Computation 
Element Protocol [46] and the Locator ID Separation Protocol [47]. For virtualisation 
support, ODL offers Virtual Tenant Manager at both the control and application planes. 
2.2.3 OpenFlow Protocol 
OpenFlow is the de facto southbound interface protocol for SDN. It facilitates 
communications between the controller and forwarding devices at the lower plane. 
OpenFlow evolved from the Stanford projects Secure Architecture for Networked 
Enterprise (SANE) and Ethane [48]. SANE was developed as a single layer responsible 
for governing connectivity and access control as a centralised entity to provide network 
security. 
OpenFlow inherits the concept of forwarding tables from traditional network protocols 
such as Ethernet. However, its flow-based approach means that sequences of packets 
belonging to the same flow are subject to the same rules and decisions. These rules are 
installed in the forwarding tables, which are handled by controllers installed on devices. 
OpenFlow allows bidirectional communications between devices and the controller, 
meaning that devices can notify or refer to the controller for specific decisions [49]. 
Figure 2.3 shows the main components of an OpenFlow switch. The controller 
communicates with the switch via the control channel to manage one or more flow 
tables [49]. 
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Figure 2.3. OpenFlow switch architecture [49]. 
Each switch in the SDN network is configured by the Internet Protocol (IP) address and 
a port number to communicate with the controller. Communications are secured over 
transport layer security channels. The first message sent by the controller is a feature 
request, which collects the device’s configuration, such as its physical address and 
available ports. 
Each table contains several records known as flow entries, which are accessed by the 
controller. Figure 2.4 depicts the flow entry fields. The entry is used to match against 
the incoming packet headers to execute an action on the packets. 
 
Figure 2.4. OpenFlow entry field [49]. 
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 Counters: contain statistics on the packets and flow, e.g. per-flow counters, 
received packets, received bytes and duration seconds and nanoseconds 
 Instructions: actions applicable to the packet, e.g. Forward, Enqueue, Drop and 
Modify-Field 
 Timeouts: expire time for the flow in the switch 
 Cookies: thresholds implemented by the controller to filter statistics and modify 
flows 
 Flags: decide how a sequence of packets is processed. 
The controller uses two approaches, proactive and reactive, to install rules in switches in 
the flow table. In a proactive installation, the controller adds the rules in advance 
(before the packets reaching the switch). In the reactive mode, there is no match for the 
packet initially, but the device forwards the packet to the controller, which then adds the 
appropriate rule in the flow table. 
OpenFlow supports three types of messages: 
 Controller-to-switch messages, which are initiated by the controller: 
o Features: In request/reply mode, the controller sends a feature request 
message to the switch to inquire about the identity and capabilities of the 
switch and the switch replies with a feature reply message. 
o Configuration: The controller sets and queries the switch configurations 
and the switch responds to the query, sending the required information to 
the controller. 
o Modify-State manages installed rules on the switch flow table and 
configures switch ports. 
o Read-State collects statistics from the switch. 
o Send-Packet sends the packet out through a specific port on the switch. 
o Barrier: Used for message verification. 
 Asynchronous messages are initiated by the switch: 
o Packet-in encapsulates a packet to send to the controller either because 
no predefined rule exists, or while the rule exists, its associated action is 
forwarded to the controller. 
o Flow-Removed notifies the controller of an entry removal from the flow 
table. 
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o Port-status notifies the controller if the port status has changed. 
o Error informs the controller of fault occurrences on the switch. 
 Symmetric messages are initiated by both the controller and the switch: 
o Hello messages initiate the session. 
o Echo request/replay messages are similar to ping in the Internet Control 
Message Protocol. 
o Vendor: customised messages sent by the vendor. 
In OpenFlow protocol specifications, the controller is responsible for modifying the 
forwarding tables in SDN devices. The flowchart in Figure 2.5 depicts the OpenFlow 
process of incoming packets. Upon the arrival of a new packet, the switch searches for a 
matching forwarding entry in the forwarding table. If a record matches the packet fields, 
a predefined action will be executed. OpenFlow allows a set of measures to be taken, 
including to drop, forward or modify the packet. If no match occurs, the switch 
forwards the packet to the controller to conduct computations according to the policy 
issued by the application layer. 
 
Figure 2.5. OpenFlow flowchart [49]. 
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2.3 Software-Defined Network Applications 
A primary concept in the SDN model is network device programmability, which boosts 
applications developed for various purposes. Applications can be classified according to 
their purposes, such as network traffic engineering, network monitoring and 
measurements, Virtualisation, and network security. The following three subsections 
cover the first three classes, while security is covered in Chapter 3. 
2.3.1 Network Traffic Engineering 
The primary objective of traffic engineering is performance optimisation in networking 
through achieving a set of objectives, including reducing congestion, end-to-end delays, 
power consumption and packet loss, maximising the quality of service and optimising 
load balance and resource utilisation. The static architecture of traditional networks is a 
significant challenge for traffic engineering tasks [49]. Characteristics of SDN, such as 
resilience, programming, centralisation and network function virtualisation capabilities, 
promise the facilitation of traffic engineering solutions. 
Multiprotocol label switching is a common traffic engineering routing mechanism to 
forward data from one device to the next based on short labels rather than long network 
addresses, reducing the time of table lookups [50]. However, multiprotocol label 
switching suffers from limitations. 
Traffic splitting is a common mechanism to reduce network traffic congestion. There 
are two approaches to traffic splitting: packet-based and flow-based. Packet-based 
splitting can result in packet reordering that may be overheard at the other end of the 
connection, especially in Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) sessions, resulting in 
congestion at the destination. In flow-based splitting, decisions are made by forwarding 
devices; however, these decisions may not be optimal because they are based on local 
parameters, rather a global network view [51]. Hence, SDN provides a solution because 
it provides a global view of the network. Additionally, SDN can improve optimal path 
computations because it provides a logically centralised view of the network. Databases 
used by traffic engineering mechanisms must present a real-time view of the network—
in traditional architecture, device states are scattered throughout the network, but in 
SDN, the controller has mechanisms to update the database in real-time for all devices 
in the network. 
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Pythia is a traffic engineering system for data centres that utilises the SDN–ODL 
controller model. Hadoop MapReduce is a big data analytics tool to analyse and refine 
control of data centres networks [52]. QNOX is an extension of the NOX controller that 
promotes quality of service enforcement; its authors claim it improves resource 
discovery, route computations and fault notifications [53]. Aster*X is an application 
based on the NOX controller for web server load balancing—it uses the controller to 
harvest the node states and control paths using OpenFlow to facilitate network 
reconfiguration by allowing administrators to control capacity [54]. ElasticTree is an 
energy consumption optimiser for data centres based on NOX—it tunes active devices 
in real-time according to traffic loads [55]. 
2.3.2 Network Monitoring 
Network monitoring and measurement are essential mechanisms for network operators 
and administrators, while awareness of device status and network behaviour is critical 
for making decisions regarding network management, quality of service, threat response 
and traffic engineering [56]. The network monitoring process includes five stages [57]: 
 Measurements and collection of data from network devices over predefined time 
frequencies: Measurements are classified as active or passive. In active 
measurements, network agents probe devices for return of data, while in passive 
measurements, agents act only as receivers of data sent by the network nodes. 
 Pre-processing: Data collected from different nodes are aggregated and 
normalised. 
 Transmission: Raw harvested data are transferred from the data sink (e.g. the 
management information base) to the node responsible for analytics. Simple 
Network Management Protocol is a widely used protocol to transfer data. 
 Analysis: Different algorithms are applied to the data to identify specific 
patterns and big data algorithms and tools are used for data analytics. 
 Visualisation: Presents results in formats that are easily understandable and may 
be quickly absorbed by network administrators for making decisions. 
SDN can improve the subprocess of collection and transmission based on its 
architectural attributes such as centralisation and programmability. In traditional 
networks, network agents collect data from network nodes periodically—this approach 
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is rigid and inefficient in terms of consistency, performance and resource optimisation. 
In contrast, SDN involves a central entity with a global view that can intelligently 
decide which data from which devices need to be collected. For data transmission, 
instead of using a classic management information base, SDN offers a flexible 
development in new data structures according to requirements. 
Procera is a framework based on SDN that allows network administrators to annotate 
policies applicable to responding to specific network events [58]. Its policy is written in 
high-level functional programming language and compiled to a set of forwarding rules 
at the underlying nodes in the physical plane. 
OpenSample is a platform to reduce sampling latency based on the Floodlight controller 
[59]. It uses a modified flow standard for packet export. Its authors claim it reduces 
latency from 1–5 seconds to 100 ms. OpenNetMon is a module integrated into the POX 
controller that monitors flow metrics related to packet loss, throughput and latency [60]. 
It probes flow source and destination devices periodically in cases where poll time slots 
are subject to changes. 
2.3.3 Software-Defined Networks for Virtualisation 
Network virtualisation enables and maximises resource sharing between several isolated 
networks running in their own containers [61]. Network virtualisation solutions 
efficiently increase hardware utilisation and reduce expenditure and operational costs. 
Virtualisation is an essential service technology in data centres and cloud computing 
infrastructure, allowing tenants to acquire networking services according to their 
requirements [62]. 
Virtualisation in the traditional networking model faces two challenges: network 
topology and addressing. Various networking environments require different network 
topologies. Additionally, addressing schemes such as IP versions 4 and 6 are related to 
physical devices. 
SDN abstraction capabilities facilitate virtualisation by adding an intermediate layer, 
which is analogous to middleware hypervisors in computing virtualisations. The new 
layer acts as a proxy between the NOS and physical devices. The purpose of the layer is 
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to seamlessly encapsulate the process required for sharing resources and isolating tasks 
[63]. 
The hypervisor, or virtual machine monitor, is responsible for monitoring various 
virtual networks and allocates required resources such as link capacity [64], [65]. 
Hypervisors have three abstraction attributes: 
 Device abstraction: Similar to other computing devices, virtualisation targets the 
central processing unit and related storage. This is mainly used for flow table 
resources. 
 Physical link abstraction: This focuses on virtualisation of physical connections, 
available link capacity and buffers at both ends of the link. 
 Topology abstraction: The hypervisor uses the abstraction of devices and links 
to implement the required network topology. 
An essential virtualisation attribute is isolation. In SDN-based virtualisation, isolation 
must be done on three levels [65], [66]: 
 Addressing isolation: Each slice of the network or virtual network flow spaces, 
which represent a subset of the entire available flow, must be separated from 
each other. Additionally, consistency problems such as generalisation, 
correlation and shadowing issues may exist in the access control list. 
 Data plane isolation: Device central processing units, associated storage and 
physical links should be isolated for each tenant. 
 Control plane: Each slice must have its own controller. 
FlowN is a NOX-based SDN distributed hypervisor that adopts the concept of 
containerisation in which the entire network is running on a single controller, with each 
tenant having a standalone slice [67]. AutoSlice is a proposed virtualisation layer that 
focuses on the automation of the slicing process itself [68]. Slices Isolator handles 
problems related to virtual network isolation and performance and flexibility trade-offs 
[69]. It offers different levels of isolation from which network operators can choose 
according to their performance and isolation requirements. 
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2.4 Software-Defined Networks in Various Networking Environments 
SDN can replace the traditional networking model in several networking environments, 
including IoT, data centres, cloud computing and wireless networks. The following 
sections discuss these various environments, the challenges of current traditional 
networks and how SDN can mitigate these limitations, providing some sample 
implementations. 
2.4.1 Software-Defined Networks for the Internet of Things 
IoT introduces new challenges to the conventional communication model. IoT network 
characteristics such as object heterogeneity and scalability require revolutionary 
solutions. Currently, there is no universal architecture for IoT. However, several 
architectures have been proposed based on SDN. SDN introduces network 
programmability and centralisation, which facilitate network abstraction, simplify 
network management and ease evolution. The proposed framework in chapter 4 with the  
SDN integration can be utilised as a novel communication architecture for IoT. SDN 
enhances network resilience and scalability, which are essential in large-scale IoT 
deployments such as smart cities. 
IoT expands the capability of the internet by connecting smart objects such as grid 
health and environmental devices. Advancements in wireless communication, 
embedded systems and sensor technologies have accelerated the adoption of the IoT 
model in several domains. However, higher connectivity increases the risk of privacy 
and security threats. 
IoT introduces three challenges: first, the heterogeneous composition of the network; 
second, the adoption of widely distributed architecture, specifically in applications such 
as smart cities and smart grids; and third, the introduction of new protocols to handle 
specific issues related to power and computation limitations of network sensors [70]-
[73]. 
The IoT threat vector has been extended with new attacks, including object cloning, 
firmware replacement and extraction of security parameters. Several studies have 
proposed an SDN-based architecture to enhance the security of IoT. Some studies have 
considered a domain-based architecture in which the network includes multiple domains 
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[74], [75]. The separation of domains enhances the availability of the network. 
However, a robust performance analysis has not been conducted. Bhunia and Gurusamy 
[76] propose a detection system based on SDN for denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on 
IoT, with the authors claiming they achieved a precision of around 98%. Chakrabarty et 
al. [78] propose an SDN-based IoT architecture called Black SDN, which secures 
payload and metadata through encryption. However, routing suffers complications as 
the source and destination data in the header are also encrypted. Jararweh et al. [79] 
focused on IoT management aspects by proposing a comprehensive SDN-based 
architecture—SDIoT—to enhance IoT management by enhancing the forwarding, 
storing and securing of data generated from IoT objects. 
2.4.2 Software-Defined Networks for Cloud and Data Centres 
Cloud computing is a model of Internet-based computing that represents an integrated 
platform of network hardware and software that provide specific internet services on a 
pay-per-use basis. Cloud computing provides three levels of service: software as a 
service, platform as a service and infrastructure as a service. The top level, software as a 
service, provides software on demand—examples include email software such as 
Microsoft Office 365. Platform as a service offers platforms used by application 
developers, while infrastructure as a service, the lowest level, offers the most basic 
services such as virtual machines and virtual networks. 
The cloud computing paradigm considers two characteristics: elasticity and dynamic 
reconfiguration. The cloud platform operates in several data centres, including Amazon 
EC2 and Microsoft Azure, and this environment contains an enormous number of 
networking devices, servers and dense existence for virtualisation services. The 
complex structure of these data centres and the vast number of internetworking devices 
and servers raise issues related to scalability and performance. As discussed previously, 
the rigid structure of the traditional network creates a challenge for cloud computing 
platforms. The giant leader Google built B4, an SDN-based wide area network 
connecting Google data centres around the globe [83]. 
SDN characteristics such as centralisation, programmability, a global view of the 
network and, most importantly, virtualisation capabilities, allows SDN to be an enabler 
technology for data centres and cloud computing platforms [1]. Based on various SDN-
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based clouds computing architecture, the authors concluded that an abstract architecture 
consists of three layers mapped to SDN model planes as follows: 
 Cloud manager application receives requests for resource allocations and 
provides services for management, monitoring and performance optimisation. 
The ODL controller—discussed in section 2.1.1—allows the integration of cloud 
manager software such as OpenStack [19]. 
 Controllers similar to SDN architecture provide basic NOS services. Figure 2.6 
shows the ODL controller support OpenStack at the controller plane with the 
OpenStack service module. 
 The physical plane includes the network resources to be provisioned by the 
cloud manager. 
 
Figure 2.6. OpenDaylight OpenStack application support [19]. 
CloudNaas is a NOX-based cloud networking platform that supports infrastructure as a 
service cloud for virtual network creation and isolation [84]. Meridian is an IBM cloud 
platform for creating and managing virtual network topologies according to workload 
[37]. Meridian can be integrated with OpenStack and IBM SmartCloud [85]. 
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2.4.3 Software-Defined Networks for Wireless Networks and 5G 
Wireless networks can be classified into four main classes: cellular, wireless sensors 
and wireless mesh networks [86], [87]. Cellular networks integrate a combination of 
technologies such as 4G, Long-Term Evolution, various standards of wi-fi and 
Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access. This combination requires 
transparent, soft, hands-off, efficient resource management. Cellular networks are 
composed of two major components, a core network and a radio access network. The 
core network is the basis of connectivity, providing access to mobile stations or end 
users. The core network provides connectivity between different radio access networks, 
managing services such as hands-off, roaming and quality of service. In wireless sensor 
networks, the major challenges are related to limited computation and power resources 
in the sensors—these challenges were covered in the previous section on IoT. Wireless 
mesh networks or ad hoc wireless networks involve the connection of devices without 
infrastructures such as access points, with routing on a hope-to-hope basis. The routing 
mechanism and absence of a central node cause interference and negatively affect 
performance [86]. 
Fundamentally, the wireless network faces challenges such as interference and 
frequency management that do not exist in wired networks. Additionally, security 
threats originating from the medium used by wireless networks, which is not 
constrained by wires or optical fibres as in wired networks, are mounting. The medium 
imposes the need for new solutions because techniques such as collision detection are 
not applicable in wireless networks; hence, to avoid collisions in advance, a solution for 
collision avoidance emerges. Solutions for sharing frequency bands, such as various 
types of multiplexing (e.g. time-division multiplexing and frequency-division 
multiplexing), create additional problems such as hidden and exposed nodes, which 
require solutions such as Request to Send and Clear to Send, increasing complexity and 
affecting performance. 
SDN characteristics such as resilience and centralisation offer opportunities to tackle 
issues such as power and frequency changes or network handovers in the dynamically 
changing environment of wireless networks. Additionally, wireless networks are 
heterogeneous, and the concept of abstraction in SDN, by supporting different devices 
from different vendors, is key to handling the problem of heterogeneity in wireless 
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networks [1]. In cellular network resource utilisation, optimisation is essential, 
particularly in high-density areas, and network designers adopt various techniques to 
allow more users in the same cell to use the frequency efficiently. One of these 
techniques is cell splitting in which a cell is divided into smaller cells, with each sub-
cell having its own base station with lower transmission power to avoid interference 
from adjacent cells. The technique has its drawbacks, including an increased number of 
cells, which increases the probability of interference and complexity in management 
[88]-[90]. 
For resource allocation of radio access in cellular networks, SoftRAN provides an 
abstraction for base stations. At the control plane, the abstraction is conducted in three 
dimensions: time, frequency and space [91]. The SoftRAN control plane is responsible 
for operations such as hands-off and transmission power controls for each base station 
to avoid interference. In the core network, Softcell is an SDN-based application that 
resolves the complexity and delay associated with the resources allocation in the core 
network, allowing the core network to access the data plane in the radio access network 
and have a global view of the entire network to support routing through middleboxes 
installed on switches [92]. 
2.5 Software-Defined Network Challenges 
Despite the opportunities introduced by the novel model, SDN faces various challenges, 
raising questions regarding its suitability as a singular model. In this section, we 
categorise those challenges into four classes: 
 Architectural challenges related to design, which affect the non-functional 
requirements of the model as a unit 
 Controller challenges, such as distributed controller design 
 Data plane challenges, such as switch design and interoperability 
 Application plane challenges. 
Security is also a major challenge of the SDN model. Given that this thesis focuses on 
the security of SDN, we discuss this flaw in the next chapter. 
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2.5.1 Software-Define Network Model Architecture Drawbacks 
Traditional networking models enclose the control and data planes within the same 
device. Required communications between both planes are almost simultaneous. In 
SDN, the controller and data planes communicate over an OpenFlow communication 
transport layer security channel. Communication and its associated encryption and 
decryption processes cause latency. Additionally, latency increases in distributed 
controller architecture in which controllers use east/westbound channels to 
communicate and synchronise the global view of the network. In conventional 
networks, the control plane is distributed in case of failure for various reasons, including 
security breaches. Affected devices will be out of service, but other devices will still be 
able to operate, enhancing the availability of network services. Centralisation of the 
control plane creates a single point of failure if the controller is out of service. 
Subsequently, all devices at the data plane will also fail [1], [7]. 
2.5.2 Controller Challenges 
In high-density networking environments such as data centres, a single controller model 
is impractical because large data centres, such as Google B4, are geographically 
scattered over different locations and have high availability and throughput 
requirements. Hence, a scalable distributed design is more practical. Distributed 
architecture may be hierarchal or peer-to-peer. Controller scalability faces two 
challenges: latency in controller communications and management of the backend 
database by the controllers [1]. [40], [92]. 
Controller scalability by integrating different controllers is another challenge for SDN 
deployment. The controller comprises software that is coded in a specific programming 
language. Languages such as C++ support performance over portability. Java offers 
excellent portability, but its performance is affected by the two-step encoding by the 
compiler and the interpreter. The programming language will affect controller 
interaction with the applications plane (northbound communication) and 
intercommunications between controllers in distributed controller architecture 
(east/westbound communication). Solutions focus on two approaches—general network 
policy programming language and API. Pyretic was an early attempt to abstract 
applications in which the network administrator or programmers could build a modular 
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application from already existing modules (similar to the concept of programming 
language packages). However, given its weak performance, it was not industrially 
applicable [94]. API in the controller scenario facilitates east/westbound communication 
between controllers. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has proposed an SDN 
interface protocol for inter-SDN controller communications. However, these steps are 
still far from meeting practical interoperability requirements [95]. 
2.5.3 Data Plane Challenges 
Traditional networks have existed for decades, with industry and governments investing 
heavily in its infrastructure. The transition from this model to SDN should consider 
interoperability between the two models. Another challenge at the data plane is device 
heterogeneity, with vendors providing different switches with a wide range of 
inconsistencies in performance, features and compliance with protocol specifications 
[1], [7]. One solution for design inconsistency problems in SDN-compatible devices, 
offered by tinyNBI, is the provision of a basic API [95]. The authors extracted five 
fundamental abstractions and provided a low-level API, which can be used for higher-
level abstractions regardless of the OpenFlow version or switch design. Additionally, 
the SDN-promoting organisation Open Networking Foundation have founded a 
specialised group, the Forwarding Abstractions Working Group [96], which is working 
to deliver new standards for network forwarding targets. The main goal of the group is 
to enhance and enforce OpenFlow standards on forwarding devices. 
2.5.4 Application Plane Challenges 
SDN applications require a high level of abstractions. Traditional programming 
languages offer a low level of abstractions (even when comparing scripting languages to 
more level programming languages such as C and C++). The purpose of SDN 
applications is to annotate network policy, which requires a high level of abstraction 
that is closer to formal specification notations. Application authentication and access 
control to the services offered by the controller is an essential step to secure the SDN. 
Additionally, application isolation should be done at two levels—first, applications 
should be isolated from each other, and second, the control plane should be isolated 
from the application plane [8]. 
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2.6 Summary 
This chapter provided the background of the SDN model, which introduced the 
separation of the control and data planes. The chapter focused on SDN architecture, 
which consists of three planes: application, control and data planes. Given that the 
controller is the most critical element for model security, the chapter provided an in-
depth examination of this plane. Main components of the control plane were discussed 
in detail and, subsequently, an anatomical view of one of the most renowned SDN 
controllers, ODL, was applied. Additionally, the chapter introduced and discussed the 
dominant southbound protocol, OpenFlow, which is responsible for communications 
between the controller and the networking devices at the forwarding plane. It is essential 
to understand how the protocol is integrated with the controller. 
The following two sections discussed the applications of SDN and the environments in 
which SDN can provide fundamental solutions. SDN applications include networking 
traffic engineering, network monitoring and virtualisation solutions. Several emerging 
technologies can benefit from SDN architecture, including IoT, clouds, data centres and 
wireless technologies, including 5G cellular networks. For each of these environments, 
the basic concepts, challenges and solutions offered by SDN was discussed. 
The global view of SDN enhances decision-making in network traffic engineering. 
Additionally, it provides an efficient routing path computation supported by the 
centralised controller. Network monitoring applications such as OpenNetMon provide 
efficient mechanisms for measuring statistics related to network throughput and packet 
loss. Another notable success of SDN is its virtualisation ability, which is supported by 
device abstraction and hypervisor layers implemented at the control planes. 
This chapter introduced several challenges and ongoing research in SDN networking. 
These challenges were classified into four groups: challenges related to architecture 
design and those related to the application, control and data planes. The majority of 
these challenges are related to programmability and centralisation of SDN. For example, 
centralisation introduced new challenges for the controller architecture—questions 
about performance, scalability, flexibility and security in both centralised and 
distributed controller architectures were raised. Network programmability allows 
applications to access networking devices, raising concerns related to authentication, 
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authorisation and accounting. Additionally, the model inherited challenges, including 
those related to security, from traditional IP networking. Security is a significant 
challenge—the following chapters will focus on security challenges and solutions.  
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Chapter 3: Software-Defined Network Security Analysis 
This chapter discusses the security of SDN. The primary goal of this chapter is to 
provide a broad and inclusive understanding of security in the SDN model. It 
investigates the controller’s security flaws and how these threats differ from threats in 
traditional networks. We identify threat attributes and their consequences on the 
network assets. A comprehensive understanding of attacks will improve the efficiency 
of countermeasures. The security analysis is conducted in three stages. First, a STRIDE 
(spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information gathering, and denial of service and 
elevation of privilege) analysis is conducted to identify possible threats from the design 
perspective. The second analysis identifies attacks using attack trees. The third analysis 
simulates attacks to identify practical consequences and recommended measures to 
address threats. 
The chapter is organised into five sections. The first section is an introduction to both 
the opportunities and deficiencies in the security of SDN, providing an in-depth view of 
SDN security and security limitations. 
Sections 2 and 3 present a review of SDN security from the current literature. The 
second section discusses how SDN improves network security through its wide range of 
security applications that enable the enforcement of security policies and monitor and 
detect threats. 
The third section investigates the security deficiencies of the SDN model. This section 
provides an analytical view of SDN-related threats. Analytics were carried out using 
STRIDE and attack trees. STRIDE is a system-oriented threat modelling method that 
models DFDs of the system under analysis. The main elements of the model are data 
flow, data stores, processors, interactors and trust boundaries. Thereafter, DFD 
components were examined against a set of attacks specified by the STRIDE list 
(spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information gathering, denial of service and elevation 
of privilege). An attack tree is a formal, attack-oriented approach to identify possible 
attacks against the system. The attack tree begins with a root node that represents an 
attack goal, with many tree branches specifying methods to reach the node. Logical 
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AND/OR operators were used to aggregate leaves. The attack tree analysis was 
supported by various tools such as Isograph. 
The fourth section discusses the simulation of several attacks identified in the previous 
section on an SDN network. The simulation was applied to an SDN network using 
Mininet [97] and ODL SDN controller, followed by the use of several exploits to launch 
the attacks. The final section concludes the chapter. 
3.1 Introduction 
Data communication architecture has remained stable for decades. As the pace of 
technology has accelerated, there is a need to adopt a new model to reduce the 
complexity and inflexibility of traditional networks. Pillar technologies of SDN, such as 
central network control, programmability and network virtualisation, have been 
researched for decades [1]. OpenFlow introduces the concept of separating the control 
and forward planes and represents a novel communication architecture. 
Centralisation and programmability offered by the SDN model are critical attributes 
utilised by developers to implement new security applications for various purposes such 
as monitoring and threat response. Despite the significant advantages offered by the 
new SDN architecture, including flexibility, programmability and centralisation, the 
model introduces unprecedented security threats. 
Security is a primary concern of the new model. The SDN controller is a crucial layer in 
the network. A single point orchestrating the entire network may be utilised to enhance 
network security; however, paradoxically, this centralised architecture is more 
vulnerable to attacks. The controller is an attractive target for attackers because it is 
accessible from applications in the higher plane and dominates physical devices at the 
lower plane. 
This study examines threats related to SDN architecture, specifically those related to the 
controller plane. There are two approaches for carrying out security analysis, namely 
system-oriented and attack-oriented approaches. For research comprehensiveness and 
consistency, a method from each approach was chosen. The security analysis was 
conducted in three stages. First, a STRIDE analysis was developed to identify possible 
threats in the SDN architecture design model. Second, various possible attacks using 
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attack remodelling were described. Third, attacks were practically simulated for 
demonstration and proof of concept. 
The purpose of the study was to provide an inclusive realisation of threats emerging 
from the introduction of the control layer. This chapter investigates threat attributes, 
types of threats in traditional networks and the SDN model and consequences of threats. 
An understanding of attacks will improve the efficiency of countermeasures. 
3.2 Software-Defined Networks for Security 
The rigorous and inflexible architecture of the traditional communication network has 
hindered its innovation [98], [99]. Multiple attempts have been made to adopt a flexible 
network model with separate control and forward planes. Separation has introduced 
programmability and centralisation features, which have been harnessed to enhance the 
security of the network. This section explores SDN applications that enhance network 
security, such as those that enforce and verify network policies and detect and mitigate 
threats. 
3.2.1 Policy Enforcement 
Network policy is a set of configurations, rules and constraints that govern network 
operations (e.g. network access, incident handling and communications isolation) [100]. 
The architecture imposes policy enforcement through network middleboxes. 
Middleboxes are devices deployed to manipulate network traffic for specific purposes 
such as inspection, threat detection and access control. 
Traditionally, two approaches have been used to enforce network policy, either by 
deploying middleboxes between endpoints in network paths or by attaching them to 
middle switches. Given that both options necessitate rigorous deployment, they lack 
flexibility  [101]. 
SDN architecture offers two advantages that are not available in traditional networks: 
 Complete network coverage: Network policy is enforced at switching devices by 
installing flow rules. In conventional networks, middleboxes such as firewalls 
and intrusion prevention systems are located at specific points in the network, 
typically at network entry points such as demilitarised zones, either on or off 
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network paths. Both deployments are inflexible and incomprehensive. Figure 3.1 
depicts a firewall dedicated to external traffic where coverage of internal traffic 
is limited. The IDS provides protection for specific subnets. In SDN networks, 
programmable switches are distributed over multiple locations in the network. 
This architecture avoids single point failure and enforces policy inside the 
network between endpoints. 
 Centralisation facilitates policy deployment and configuration. This is in 
contrast to middlebox configurations in existing networks in which network 
administrators implement and deploy the policy from a single point rather than 
configuring appliances explicitly. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Network policy enforcing middleware device locations. 
Historically, the OpenFlow protocol evolved as a successor of the Ethane project [102]. 
The purpose of Ethane was to define a network policy and enforce it at the switches. 
Ethane was an instantiation of SANE [48]. The domain controller based on network 
policy calculates the flow table entries installed on the switches. Given that the project 
requires custom switches, network upgrading was expensive. Integration of Ethane 
networks with current networks did not provide holistic policy enforcement where there 
was a probability of traffic passing through other non-Ethane custom switches. 
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SDN features reintroduced a policy enforcement method known as active security [103]. 
This concept includes five phases of adaptable network policy: 
 Initial configuration of the infrastructure 
 Sense: the controller responsible for collecting data from the network 
 Adjusting the configuration as the controller updates the policy according to the 
network status 
 Forensics: the controller gathers information related to attacks 
 Respond: the controller initiates a reconnaissance and counter-reaction. 
3.2.2 Security Policy Verification 
As the complexity of networks has escalated, there has been the need to ensure and 
verify the attached security policies. The conflict between policies or even between 
rules in the same policy may lead to network exposure. 
FlowGuard is an SDN-based framework to detect firewall policy violations. Upon the 
update of the network status, FlowGuard will dynamically analyse the path space to 
detect firewall rule conflicts [104]. Flover is another SDN security policy verifier [105] 
based on checking systems and was built on the NOX controller to provide formal 
verification of security policies. Flover transforms flow table rules into a binary tree 
diagram and applies formal methods to detect rule violations. 
3.2.3 Intrusion Detection 
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) are software or hardware systems 
dedicated to observing the network for security breaches. Standard IDPS processes 
comprise three stages: collection of data from the network, analysis and execution of 
actions in case of threat detection. There are three major data analysis methods for 
detection of breaches: signature-based detection, anomaly-based detection and 
specification-based detection [11]. Signature-based detection is used when a system has 
a database of predefined violation signatures and matches that signature against network 
activity signatures. Anomaly analysis is used when the system identifies abnormal 
activities. Normal activities are identified in a baseline profile, which the system 
develops in a learning phase. In stateful protocol analysis, a predefined pattern of 
protocol behaviour is established and a comparison between network activities and the 
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expected behaviour defined by protocols raises the alarm in the case of profile violation. 
A combination of methods is used to maximise IDPS performance. A study compared 
various detection methods proposed in [11]. Each method has its advantages and 
disadvantages—a significant weakness of signature-based detection is its inability to 
detect new attacks, while anomaly-based detection has a higher false alarm rate. The 
majority of commercial implementations use a hybrid approach. 
Fundamentally, network-based IDPSs have a packet or flow-capturing module [12]. The 
capturing engine sniffs packets or flows for specific features. Feature selection relies on 
the threats targeted by the IDPS. 
From the perspective of SDN, current research [10]-[12] has focused on packet and 
traffic measurements such as traffic engineering, load balancing, monitoring and 
security. Network central view and programmability provide the necessary assets to 
develop a robust packet/flow inspection system. SDN consists of three layers, namely 
applications, controller and forwarding devices. The controller has the capacity to 
communicate with devices through southbound protocols such as OpenFlow. OpenFlow 
provides the API to poll devices for traffic statistics. Traffic data are aggregated to the 
controller, which, in turn, communicates with the application layer through the 
OpenFlow interface. 
The architecture of anomaly-based detection based on SDN has been proposed in [106]. 
The framework distributed a DoS attack detector based on flow inspection. The system 
has been implemented on the NOX controller. OpenSketch is a notable example of SDN 
traffic measurement architecture [107]. The platform provides a library to customise 
measurements to meet specific tasks and sets measurements to detect anomaly 
behaviour. A comprehensive view of the system, which is the essence of SDN 
architecture, is a significant feature. It reinforces the design of the robust data collection 
module in IDSs. 
Studies have used the architecture of the anomaly-based detection method in SDN 
[106]. Concentration on anomaly detection based on the SDN is supported by the 
controllability of traffic. However, there is a need to adopt other detection methods in 
SDN to exploit its capabilities. 
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Specifically, SDN architecture can contribute to the enhancement of detection analysis 
techniques. Features such as scalability and ease of configuration in the case of anomaly 
detection can be improved by exploiting the centralised architecture of SDN. 
Developing a central analysis module may reduce the overhead on the monitored 
system, leading to improved performance. 
Several intrusion detection applications have been developed to detect malicious 
activities in SDN networks. For example, Defense4All is an application in the ODL 
controller to detect and mitigate DDoS attacks. 
3.2.4 Threat Response 
The SDN controller has a consistent real-time view of the entire network. Detecting 
attacks in real-time is essential for establishing an active response system. SDN is a 
flow-based rather than a destination-based networking model. Traffic control is a crucial 
feature of the response module. For example, on the assumption of threat existence, 
network middleboxes forward traffic to virtual appliances or honeypots for further 
investigation or forensic processes. Additionally, SDN programmability allows 
applications—particularly IDP applications—to communicate with forwarding devices. 
The flexibility of the architecture facilitates response mechanisms. For instance, if a 
section of the network is compromised, the response module isolates infected devices to 
mitigate the risks. 
3.2.5 Security Tools 
In this section, several SDN security solutions are surveyed. Table 3.1 shows a survey 
of different SDN-based security tools. These tools are classified into two categories: 
security enhancers or SDN security resolutions. Security enhancement tools aim to 
improve network security by utilising SDN features, while SDN security resolutions are 
tools to improve the security of the SDN itself. Additionally, the table indicates the 
layers the solution covers. 
FRESCO is a security composition framework that focuses on anomaly detection and 
mitigation [108]. Netfuse is an example of a solution that addresses security flaws in the 
SDN architecture [109], protecting the network from DoS attacks. However, there is a 
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significant shortcoming in the research related to improving the security of the SDN 
itself. 
The majority of the survey tools focus on using SDN to enhance security, more 
specifically for policy enforcement solutions. The resilience of the SDN architecture 
effectively supports the adoption of policy execution and verification applications. 
MAPPER, FlowTags, SIMPLE and OpenSafe are examples of SDN solutions for policy 
enforcement [110]–[113]. CloudWatcher [114] controls network flows to guarantee 
network security, with devices inspecting each flow. Veriflow inspects and verifies flow 
rules in real-time to ensure integrity [115]. 
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Table 3.1. SDN Security Tools Survey 
Security 
Solution 
Solution Domain Layer Description 
Security 
Enhancer 
SDN Security 
Resolution 
App Control Forward 
 
FRESCO 
[108] 
 X  X  
Security services 
composition 
framework 
LiveSec 
[116] 
X  X X X 
Security policy 
enforcement 
Netfuse 
[109] 
 X  X X 
Protection against 
traffic overload 
externally (DDoS) or 
internally 
SDN RTBH 
[113] 
X   X X DoS mitigation 
MAPPER 
[110] 
X  X X  Policy enforcement 
FlowTags 
[111] 
X  X X X 
Policy enforcement 
and verification  
SIMPLE 
[112] 
X  X X X Policy enforcement 
OpenSafe 
[117] 
X  X X  Policy verification 
CloudWatch
er [114] 
X  X X  
Ensures network 
packets are inspected 
Fortnox 
[118] 
 X  X X 
Prioritises flow rules 
to eliminate 
inconsistencies 
Flover [105] X  X X X Rule verification 
VeriFlow 
[115] 
X  X  X 
Verifies and debugs 
flow rules 
OpenFlow-
RHM [119] 
X   X X 
Mutates hosts as a 
response to threat 
existence 
OrchSec 
[120] 
X  X X X 
Security application 
development 
framework 
FlowNac 
[121] 
X   X X 
Flow-based access 
control 
PermOF 
[122] 
 X  X X 
Fine-grained 
permission and 
isolation system for 
SDN apps 
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3.3 Security Limitations of Software-Defined Networks 
Despite the many voices preaching the promising future of SDN, various challenges 
prevent the broad adoption of the new model. Contradictorily, the primary advantages 
of the new architecture are the origins of its weaknesses. Performance, scalability, 
resilience and security are the main issues to tackle in the context of current research on 
SDN [1], [7], [8]. 
In contrast to traditional networks, SDN has performance trade-offs. A tightly coupled 
data and control plane in a single processing device is performance oriented. In SDN 
process flow, devices refer to the controller to perform logical decisions. The delegation 
of logical processes causes latency and negatively affects the throughput of devices [7]. 
The current stream of research is focused on improvements to hardware such as 
processing chips [1]. 
Essential questions about SDN scalability are raised. The network controller is 
responsible for logically updating forwarding tables in the connected device pool. In 
real-world networks, the controller is responsible for processing a large number of 
messages sent from forwarding devices. This raises the question regarding the number 
of nodes a controller should support. In this study, the network was scaled by adding 
more controllers to manipulate issues such as consistency. The term ‘consistency’ is 
essential in the SDN network because the controller, or a set of controllers, should 
maintain the same view of the network. HyperFlow [123] provides a solution for 
updating the network state by propagating events that affect the network state. 
A single point of control is equivalent to a single point of failure. This configuration is a 
significant threat to network resilience and fault tolerance. SDN resilience remains an 
open question [1]. A distributed controller has been proposed to improve SDN 
flexibility [7]. 
Security threats are critical challenges in traditional networks and are escalated in SDN 
networks. The new architecture has brought additional challenges that did not exist in 
traditional networks. In particular, threats target the control layer [8]. The following 
sections highlight the security concerns of the controller and the standard southbound 
protocol, OpenFlow. 
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Security breaches are significant challenges in traditional data communications systems. 
Security challenges are escalated in SDN networks because the architecture introduces 
additional concerns that did not exist in traditional networks. OpenFlow’s security 
analysis study [124] revealed several attacks derived from the SDN-prevalent protocol, 
such as DoS attacks on flow tables and control channels. Conflicts in application 
privileges propagate to flow rules. Fortnox provides role-based authentication and 
security policy enforcement [101]. Fortnox conducts a real-time rule conflict analysis to 
reveal rule contradictions [118]. Several intrusion detection applications have been 
developed to detect malicious activities in SDN networks. Defense4All is an application 
that detects and mitigates DDoS in the ODL controller [20]. However, the application 
does not protect the controller itself; rather, it deploys a set of rules to protect the 
network at its perimeters. The Defense4All application requests network information 
from the controller. On detection of malicious activities, the application executes 
mitigation actions according to its attack response module. A conventional technique to 
protect the controller is to deploy a distributed controller platform. However, significant 
concerns regarding distributed architecture have emerged, including network 
performance trade-offs. Given that multiple controllers exchange information for 
orchestrated network control, this exchange process results in latency. Additionally, 
there are concerns related to data consistency and synchronisation at each control point 
[1], [7]. In communications between the controller and switching devices, data 
exchanged over communication channels need to be ciphered because TCP connections 
are exposed to various threats. Transport Layer Security encryption will provide 
standard security measures to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks. FRESCO is a security 
composition framework focused on anomaly detection and mitigation [108]. Netfuse is 
an example of a solution that addresses security flaws in SDN architecture [109], 
protecting the network from DoS attacks. However, there is a significant shortcoming in 
research related to improving the security of the SDN itself, particularly from threats 
attacking the controller [1], [7], [8], [124]. SDN security flaws are an important ongoing 
research topic. Several papers have studied challenges related to SDN architecture. 
Kreutz et al. [8] reveal seven threats associated with SDN architecture. Figure 3.2 
depicts three threats directly related to the controller. 
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Figure 3.2. Controller security threats. 
Ruffy et al. [125] used STRIDE to analyse SDN security. The study identified security 
deficiencies in generic SDN design, such as spoofing in SDN networks caused by 
unauthenticated access to one of the network elements. The authors offer potential 
countermeasures, suggesting that attacks may be resolved by enforcing contemporary 
authentication procedures. In another recent paper, the authors focused on controller and 
forwarding plan security [126]. The study conducted an analysis process based on Petri 
nets and attack trees; however, the study was limited in its scope of attacks. The study 
presented in this thesis focuses on the analysis process of the controller and augments 
the analysis with an experiment that covers several threats: 
1. Attacks on communications between the controller and data plane devices 
2. Attacks on controller vulnerabilities 
3. Attacks on the controller originating from untrustworthy applications that 
communicate with the controller. 
3.4 Software-Defined Network Security Analysis 
The first step involved defining critical security objectives, such as system availability 
and dependability. At this level, the objective was to outline the system characteristics. 
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The second step involved specifying system components, data flows and trust 
boundaries. The third step involved dissecting the system using a DFD. The diagram 
consisted of the elements shown in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. STRIDE Graphical Components 
Entity Details 
Graphical 
Representation 
Attacks 
External entity Represents the entities that interact 
with the system under the modelling 
 
Spoofing identity 
Process System nodes that perform actions on 
the data flow in the system 
 
Tampering with 
data 
Multiprocess A process composed of a subprocess 
 
Repudiation 
Data stores Where the data are kept (e.g. database 
tables) 
 
Information 
disclosure 
Data flow Data movements in the system 
 
Denial of service 
Privilege 
boundaries 
Represent the change in the level of 
trust 
 
Escalation of 
privilege 
We conducted the analysis on three levels. First, we developed a STRIDE analysis to 
define possible threats from the design perspective. Second, we described various 
attacks using attack trees. Third, we simulated possible attacks to identify actual 
consequences and recommend measures to address threats. 
At this point, it is essential to clarify the terms risk, threat, vulnerability and attack. The 
threat is the harm that can occur to a system asset. System assets are a broad range of 
resources that vary from devices to information. Threats occur when an intruder carries 
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out an attack by exploiting a weakness in the system, referred to as vulnerability. Risk is 
the intersection between threat, vulnerability and consequence. Threat modelling is the 
process of identifying and evaluating threats. Risk analysis is the identification and 
assessment of risk severity. Risk management is concerned with risk mitigation and 
elimination through the adoption of countermeasures. 
3.4.1 STRIDE 
The analysis was conducted using two approaches: a system-oriented approach, which 
focuses on system components, and an attack-oriented approach. The first stage 
employed STRIDE (spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information gathering, denial of 
service and elevation of privilege) as the system-oriented analysis method [21]. Threat 
modelling included five steps. The first step was to define the critical security 
objectives, such as system availability or dependability. At this level, the objective was 
to define system characteristics. The second step was to specify system components, 
data flows and trust boundaries. The third step was to dissect the system using a DFD. 
The fourth step examined the DFD elements against the STRIDE attacks; for instance, 
whether a particular data store element was exposed to information disclosure. The final 
step was to identify vulnerabilities to threats. Microsoft’s threat modelling tool was used 
to automate the process of analysis [127]. Figure 3.3 shows a primary DFD of the 
controller. Through multiple iterations of analysis, we identified a list of potential 
threats against the controller. 
 
Figure 3.3. Controller high-level dataflow diagram. 
.
  
6
6
 
 
Figure 3.4. Detailed dataflow diagram
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Figure 3.4. shows the threats against each component in the controller. Services and 
plug-ins are exposed to privilege escalation by changing code flow execution through 
exploiting vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow, heap overflow and string formation 
attacks. Additionally, services and plug-ins are threatened by DoS attacks by sending 
requests that exceed the available computation resources. The SAL is exposed to 
privilege elevation and DoS attacks. Additionally, SAL has a buffer that might be 
compromised by information disclosure attacks, repudiation attacks and data tampering 
attacks via changing bits. The controller has a data log file that is also at risk of 
information disclosure, tampering and repudiation threats. Data flow between the SAL 
and controller services is vulnerable to information disclosure via sniffing and spoofing 
attacks. Likewise, data flow between the SAL and OpenFlow is exposed to spoofing 
and disclosure attacks. 
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Table 3.3. Controller Threats 
 S T R I D E 
Service abstraction layer (SAL)     X X 
SAL–OpenFlow flow X   X   
SAL–Other services flow X   X   
State manager service     X X 
Topology manager     X X 
Switch manager     X X 
Forwarding manager     X X 
OpenStack service     X X 
Virtual tenant network     X X 
Open vSwitch Database 
Management Protocol 
    X X 
Group-based policy service     X X 
OpenContrail plug-in     X X 
Authentication, authorisation and 
accounting 
    X X 
Service function chaining     X X 
LISB     X X 
Data over cable interface     X X 
Secure NT bootstrap     X X 
SDN integrator interface     X X 
Controller services and plug-ins—
SAL flow 
X   X   
SAL buffer  X X X   
Controller DB  X X X   
3.4.2 Attack Trees 
In the previous section, we identified the threat vectors that may be possible risks to the 
controller. The current step is to formally describe the execution of threats—or 
attacks—from the intruder perspective. Attack trees are a semi-formal representation of 
attacks as a tree data structure. The root of the tree represents the attacker’s ultimate 
goal, while various nodes attached to the root represent the techniques used to reach the 
target [22], [128]. Operators OR and  AND specify the logical relationships between the 
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tree branches to form the attack. For example in the spoofing attack below the root 
spoofing authentication requires all the conditions in 1.1, and 1.2 to be executed to 
launch the attack. In attack 2 either 2.1 or 2.2 will be sufficient to execute the attack.  
3.4.2.1 Spoofing 
Spoofing attacks hack identity, which is not exclusive to individuals. Identity also 
includes machine identity (IP or media access control addresses), processes running on 
a host and file spoofing. The controller components are exposed to various spoofing 
threats. The attack tree is shown below: 
Goal: Spoofing access to the controller (OR) 
1. Spoofing authentication (AND) 
1.1. Spoofing the username (OR) 
1.1.1. Social engineering (OR) 
1.1.2. Brute force attacks 
1.2. Spoofing the password (OR) 
1.2.1. Social engineering 
1.2.2. Brute force attacks 
2. Spoofing the source address (OR) 
2.1. Spoofing the media access control address 
2.2. Spoofing the Internet Protocol address 
3.4.2.2 Denial-of-service attacks 
DoS attacks exhaust system resources such as bandwidth, memory and storage. 
Typically, the SDN controller adds a processing overhead to network resources. Thus, 
the severity of DoS attacks is a significant concern in SDN networks. The attack tree is 
shown below: 
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Goal: Attack controller availability by exhausting system resources (OR) 
1. Attack controller services (OR) 
1.1. Flood requests to controller services such as authentication, authorisation and 
accounting 
2. Attack controller database 
3. Flood service abstraction layer buffer 
4. Congest network bandwidth 
3.4.2.3 Escalation of privilege 
These attacks are based on program flaws, employing techniques such as fuzzing, static 
analysis and reverse engineering to reveal coding deficiencies. Intruders without 
privileges can exploit vulnerabilities to execute remote code; subsequently, in the post-
exploitation phase, they can escalate their privileges to break into the system entirely. 
The SDN controller software is likely to have coding flaws, which may be exploited for 
privilege escalation attacks. The attack tree is shown below: 
Goal: Exploit system vulnerabilities to escalate privilege (OR) 
1. Exploit vulnerabilities in controller services (OR) 
1.1. Fuzzing controller inputs 
1.2. Analysis of controller code (OR) 
1.2.1. Static analysis 
1.2.2. Dynamic code analysis 
1.3. Reverse engineering the controller 
2. Escalate standard user privileges granted by the administrator to higher privileges 
2.1. Migrating process 
3.4.2.4 Information disclosure 
In information disclosure threats, system information such as files, file names and 
databases are exposed to unauthorised entities. An important example of information 
disclosure is Structured Query Language injection attacks. The SDN controller 
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exchanges data with applications and physical planes. These data are accessible through 
ARP table poisoning. The attack tree is shown below: 
Goal: Hacking controller data (OR) 
1. Communication sniffing (OR) 
1.1. Address Resolution Protocol poisoning 
1.2. Domain name system spoofing 
1.3. Internet Protocol spoofing 
2. Access controller machine 
2.1. Vulnerability exploitation 
2.2. Physical access 
2.2.1. Bypass authentication 
2.2.1.1. Social engineering 
2.2.1.2. Brute force 
3. Web attacks (controller web interaction) (OR) 
3.1. Structured Query Language injection 
3.1.1. Fuzzing 
3.2. Cross-site scripting attacks 
3.5 Simulation 
The purpose of the simulation was to demonstrate the threats identified in the STRIDE 
and attack tree stages that are relevant to the SDN controller. Possible attacks were 
executed against a functional controller to deduce real-time statistics and consequences. 
3.5.1 Simulation Environment 
A Mininet simulator [97] was used to emulate an SDN network. The system under test 
consisted of a set of hosts connected via OpenFlow switches in a tree topology. The 
network utilised an external ODL controller. The hostile machine was a Kali Linux 
machine connected to the same subnet to which the controller was connected [129]. The 
Kali machine used a toolkit to demonstrate various attacks. 
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ODL is an open-source SDN controller project backed by industry leaders such as 
Microsoft, Cisco, Juniper and Ericsson and is aimed at accelerating the adoption of 
SDN networks [19]. This study adopted ODL as the empirical controller for the 
following reasons: 
 ODL is sufficiently close to the standard architecture of the SDN controller. 
ODL is a distributed controller that demonstrates availability features and 
supports east/westbound APIs. The majority of controllers propose OpenFlow as 
the only southbound API; ODL goes beyond this concept by providing an SAL 
that supports the coexistence of various protocols at the southbound API. 
 ODL provides Defense4All as an intrusion detection system. This may be used 
to demonstrate deficiencies of the current detection approach in contrast to the 
approach proposed by other studies. 
 Other security features include security logging and auditing, authentication and 
authorisation services and secure control plane communication. 
3.5.1.1 Simulation execution 
A Mininet simulator was used to implement the SDN network using a tree topology 
with three switches and three hosts for each switch. The simulator used a real-time 
external ODL controller. The command used was: 
sudo mn–topo tree,depth=2,fanout=3–controller remote 
Figure 3.5 shows the simulation network from the perspective of the controller. The 
network consisted of four OpenFlow switches, with each switch connected to the hosts. 
All switches were connected to the ODL controller (installed on an Ubuntu machine). In 
the same network, there was a hostile machine (Kali). In our simulation, we assumed 
that the attacker already had access to the network. The intruder had several ways of 
hacking the network perimeter, such as by exploiting host vulnerabilities and social 
engineering. 
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Figure 3.5. Simulation environment. 
3.5.2 Discussion 
In this section, we demonstrate how controller vector attacks may be executed and their 
consequences on network resources. 
3.5.2.1 Information disclosure attacks 
Revealing information to unauthorised entities is a crucial issue for SDN controller 
security. In standard scenarios, the centralisation of SDN information in a single entity 
is a significant advantage of SDN. However, in the attack scenario, a data-intensive 
single point is a target for intruders. In this simulation, the attacker launched 
reconnaissance attacks to discover service availability by checking the OpenFlow port 
6633. A port scanning technique using Nmap can reveal all services available on a 
network [130]. The SDN centralisation paradox spares the attacker from enumerating 
the entire network. Far-reaching information disclosure attacks can occur when 
intruders gain access to the controller using publicly available exploits. In this 
simulation, the attacker used an exploit developed on a remote file inclusion 
vulnerability [131]. A Python script exploit was downloaded to the controller flow 
table. A closer inspection of the flows shows that the attacker can map the entire 
network, list nodes, services and access control lists. 
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3.5.2.2 Denial-of-service attacks 
The centralisation concept is a significant design flaw in SDN architecture. In DoS, the 
attacker floods the controller with an enormous number of requests, eventually 
exhausting resources and causing the controller to collapse. The consequences of DoS 
attacks on SDN networks are significant because the entire network turns into a ‘body 
with no brain’. In this simulation, the Kali Linux machine flooded the controller using a 
Python script of-flood. Figure 3.6 depicts the network throughput upon executing the 
flooding attack. The vertical axis represents the throughput of the controller (Ubuntu 
machine) in bytes, while the horizontal axis shows the controller time domain as the 
hostile Kali machine begins to flood the controller. The network throughput was 
between 21:25:55 and 21:26:10, which is low, given there were few communications 
between the controller and network devices. After 21:26:10, the attacker flooded the 
controller with requests, escalating throughput and eventually exhausting and plunging 
the controller. Subsequently, the entire network was brought down. Hence, despite 
centralisation being a key feature in the SDN model, it can also bring down the 
controller—request flooding may result in complete network failure. 
 
Figure 3.6. Network throughput before and after a denial-of-service attack. 
3.5.2.3 Spoofing 
Traditionally, intruders utilise tools to poison the ARP table or to spoof an IP address to 
carry out man-in-the-middle attacks. Once again, a feature of the SDN network can 
become a significant disadvantage from a security perspective. Rather than adding 
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hardware to the network, programmability saves costs and increases network flexibility 
by replacing devices with a few lines of code. From an adversary’s perspective, 
programmability is also a great advantage. In this simulation, a Python script was used 
to impersonate a switch in the network [131]. 
3.5.2.4 Tampering 
Alteration of data represents a serious penetration of the system. Additionally, 
compromising the entire network flow from a single point is a critical issue in SDN 
architecture. The attacker used a script to modify, drop and add entire rules. 
3.6 Software-Defined Network Security vs. Traditional Networks 
The security analysis and simulation models both revealed the same threats. Similar 
attack vectors can be launched against SDN networks. However, the architecture of 
SDN exposes the network to more critical consequences. In conventional networks, if 
the attacker is successful in executing a remote code against an application or 
vulnerable operating system, the consequences are limited to a single machine. The 
intruder would need to escalate privileges or use the victim machine as a pivot to break 
into other machines or subnets. In SDN networks, the controller comprises software 
similar to that of any other program; therefore, as demonstrated in the simulation, it is 
vulnerable to attacks. In traditional systems, software and hardware are integrated 
separately within various network devices (e.g. routers, switches and middleboxes); 
hence, in the case of attacks, the damage will be isolated or can be quarantined. In the 
SDN network, isolation or reduction of damage is more complex, particularly when the 
controller itself under attack. Intruders have the advantage of centralisation, meaning 
the speed and domain of attacks can be accelerated. Therefore, the SDN model 
increases security challenges. 
In the following chapters, we propose a threat detection framework. Given that both 
SDN and traditional networks are vulnerable to similar attack vectors, the framework 
addresses traditional network attacks; however, its deployment considers the new 
architecture. In deploying the framework, we recommend integration of the detection 
system at the control layer to provide essential protection to the controller itself. By 
securing the controller, we overcome a significant security issue with SDN networks. 
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3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we provided an in-depth study of controller security. The SDN model 
introduces unprecedented security challenges, specifically threats related to the 
controller. While the controller is a crucial entity in the architecture, it is also a valuable 
target for intruders. We analysed threats using two methods—STRIDE and attack 
trees—before carrying out an experiment to demonstrate various attacks. The 
experiment provided examples of vulnerabilities in the architecture. We demonstrated 
several attacks and the significant consequences of penetrating the controller. DoS 
attacks led to the failure of the entire network. Network programmability facilitated 
spoofing attacks because intruders could impersonate devices through coding. The 
effects of tampering attacks were more significant as the attacker could take control of 
the entire network by crafting data flow tables through a central point. Additionally, 
taking over the controller exposed the entire system’s information. 
SDN architecture paves the way for network innovation and reduces the complexity of 
traditional networks. However, controller security is a significant issue in the SDN 
model. Enhancing the security of the controller will increase the opportunity for SDN 
becoming the dominant networking model. In next chapters, we will focus on 
implementing an intelligent module to protect the controller itself.   
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Chapter 4: Threat Detection Framework: A Deep Learning 
Approach 
This chapter introduces the anomaly-based detection framework. The proposed 
approach utilises unsupervised DL to reduce dimensionality before applying simple 
(with respect to computation resources and calculations) clustering to the digested data. 
The framework consisted of two phases. The first phase used an unsupervised DL 
neural network and the second phase employed a simple clustering algorithm. 
DL algorithms may be used for different purposes. For example, an autoencoder may be 
used for data reconstruction and dimensionality reduction. Therefore, framework design 
principles were derived from the goals and objectives of the proposed system before 
being implemented. This chapter provides a theoretical proposal for the integration of 
the framework in the SDN model and presents the proposed detection framework. 
The first section discusses DL algorithms in anomaly-based detection. The second 
section introduces the components of the framework, which consisted of two phases: an 
unsupervised DL algorithm and a simple clustering algorithm. The third section depicts 
the framework workflow and the framework algorithm in pseudocode. Additionally, a 
detailed description of the different steps is included. The fourth section outlines the 
design principles adopted for building the framework, including dimensionality 
reduction, decision boundaries, clustering and curse of dimensionality, network traffic 
features, the number of hidden layers and neurons and the assumptions required for 
framework applicability. The fifth section describes the framework in action and the 
theoretical background of the algorithms. The sixth section depicts the integration of the 
framework in an SDN model. The seventh section explores the advantages of the 
framework. 
4.1 Introduction 
Several machine learning algorithms have been used for network anomaly detection 
[132]. A typical fundamental deficiency is a poor accuracy, which has made the 
approach industrially inapplicable. The proposed framework presented in this chapter 
shows improvement in detection accuracy. The framework adopted semi-unsupervised 
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algorithms for novel detection to tackle the rapid developments in cybersecurity attacks. 
The framework used the more elegant technique of unsupervised DL, which 
dramatically reduces features from the first phase. The framework was designed based 
on a set of principles in which the design goals were to reduce computations and 
enhance accuracy. 
Following advances in neural nets, DL has been successfully applied in various 
domains. For object recognition, Hinton et al. [14] used a deep belief network for 
Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology’s dataset image recognition, 
scoring a 1.25% error rate compared with the next lowest error rate of 1.4% achieved by 
an SVM. In an ImageNet challenge (2012), the convolutional neural network succeeded 
in reducing the error rate from 26.2% to 16.4% in a dataset containing about 14 m 
labelled images and 1,000 classes [15]. Speech recognition and signal processing are 
some of the remarkable application domains for DL. Traditionally, researchers used 
Gaussian mixture models and hidden Markov models in speech recognition 
applications. Mohamed et al. [133] reduced the phoneme error rate from 26% to 20.7% 
using deep belief networks. 
DL is a set of nonlinear algorithms for multi-layered models. DL algorithms may be 
supervised or unsupervised. In supervised learning, the training dataset contains input 
data and data labels. The algorithm learns to predict p(y/x) where x and y are the inputs 
and outputs, respectively [134]-[136]. This approach is suitable for classification and 
regression tasks. In unsupervised learning, only an unlabelled dataset is available. 
Unsupervised DL algorithms aim to learn the probability distribution of a specific 
dataset. Unsupervised applications include clustering, dimensionality reduction and 
noise removal. For network anomaly detection, we believe the unsupervised approach 
has the following advantages: first, unsupervised learning can detect internal 
representation of the dataset, which conforms to online detection. Second, unsupervised 
algorithms will theoretically discover unprecedented threats. The automatic discovery of 
features improves the probability of detecting new attacks in the context of network 
anomaly detection. Third, we can use unsupervised learning as a pre-training phase 
before using supervised or reinforcement learning to enhance detection accuracy. 
An autoencoder is a neural network consisting of two phases: 
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 An encoder, which is a deterministic mapping function (f_θ) that transforms an 
input vector (x) into a hidden representation (y): 
o θ=[2], where W is the weight matrix and b is bias 
o f_θ (x)≈x’ 
 A decoder, which reconstructs the hidden representation (y) to the reconstructed 
input (x’) via g_θ. 
The autoencoder measures the reconstruction error between x’ (reconstructed) and the 
input (x) to minimise this error (information loss): 
 𝐽(𝑊) =  ∑ ||𝑥𝑛 − 𝑥
′
𝑛 || (1) 
Where J(W) is the cost function to minimise the cost. 
 Arg min (𝐽(𝑊)){𝑤,𝑤′ ,𝑏,𝑏,} (2) 
where w and b are encoder weights and biases, respectively, and w’ and b’ are weights 
and biases, respectively, for the decoder. 
Various functions, such as squared error, may be used as cost functions. For cost 
function optimisation, several options, including stochastic gradient descent (SGD) and 
adaptive moment estimation (Adam) optimiser, are available. 
RBMs are energy-based models in which each feature configuration is assigned scalar 
energy [135]. The learning process updates the energy function to ensure the shape has 
desirable properties. The probability distribution of energy function is shown in 
Formula (3): 
 p(x) = 
𝑒−𝐸(𝑥)
𝑍
 (3) 
where Z is the partitioning function, defined in (4): 
 Z = ∑ 𝑒−𝐸(𝑥)𝑥  (4) 
Boltzmann machine’s energy function is defined in (5): 
 𝐸 (𝑥) =  − 𝑥𝑇 𝑊 𝑥 − 𝑏𝑇𝑥  (5) 
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where W is weight matrix and b is the bias parameter. 
To enhance the RBM, hidden units are introduced. RBMs are a type of Boltzmann 
machine with restrictions on connections between visible–visible and hidden–hidden 
units. The energy function of RBMs is represented by (6): 
 𝐸 (𝑣, ℎ) =  −𝑏′𝑣 − 𝑐′ℎ − ℎ′𝑊𝑣 (6) 
where b’ and c’ are the biases for visible and hidden units, respectively, and W is the 
weight of connections between hidden and visible units. 
Table 4.1 lists several research papers utilising the deep learning algorithms for 
anomalies detection.  The table shows the used dataset and other algorithms used to 
compare the performance of the deep learning algorithm. The used algorithms are 
unsupervised, different variations of autoencoders, and RBM. 
Table 4.1. Deep Learning for Anomaly Detection 
Research DL Algorithm Classic Machine Learning Algorithms Dataset 
 AE RBM SVM PCA KPCA Other  
[137]       Images 
[138]       KDD99, 
USENET, Thyroid 
[139]       KDD99 and bot 
data 
[140]       Generated traffic 
[141]       KDD99 
[142]       Lorenz, sat-A 
[143]       KDD99 
Note: AE: autoencoder; RBM: restricted Boltzmann machine; SVM: support vector machine; PCA: 
principal component analysis; KPCA: kernel PCA. 
A comprehensive study evaluated seven unsupervised machine learning algorithms 
[144], benchmarking the KDD99 dataset, and concluded that all algorithms performed 
poorly in detecting remote to local attacks, while SVM and Y-means performed well 
over the other techniques in detecting user to root attacks. Further, C-means delivered 
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the most unsatisfactory results in almost all experiments. Lastly, fuzzy clustering was 
not suitable for distinguishing normal and abnormal data in intrusion detection. 
The concept of dimensionality reduction refers to projecting highly dimensioned data 
onto a lower subspace without a significant loss of data meaning. Additionally, in lower 
dimensional data, the discrimination between normal and abnormal classes is evident 
[145]. PCA is a dimensionality reduction algorithm that learns linear relationships: 
 f (x) = W_(x )^T+b (7) 
where x is input and x ∈ R^(d_x). 
Kernel PCA is a nonlinear version of basic PCA [145]. To represent nonlinear 
relationships, a kernel function is used to map the data to higher dimensions before 
using PCA to reduce dimensionality. Autoencoder algorithms imply dimensionality 
reduction because they convert data into new representations that keep most of their 
significant features (encoder) before executing a reconstruction phase (decoder). 
Various studies compared autoencoders as a dimensionality reduction algorithm with 
PCA and its nonlinear extension, kernel PCA. One experiment that compared PCA, 
kernel PCA, autoencoder and demonising autoencoder found that the autoencoder and 
demonising autoencoder performed significantly better. The study applied the four 
algorithms to an artificial dataset and two real datasets.  
4.2 Framework Components 
Figure 4.1 depicts the main components of the proposed detection system. The 
framework was based on unsupervised deep neural networks. Two types of Unified 
Service Description Language (USDL) algorithms were used: autoencoders and RBMs. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the first layer was a deep neural network, the purpose of which 
was to reduce input features. Outcomes were then fed as inputs into the subsequent 
algorithm. 
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Figure 4.1. Proposed detection system architecture. 
Network threats are continually expanding; thus, from a security perspective, an IDS 
must be capable of detecting attacks that have not been previously seen. This concept is 
theoretically achievable using unsupervised learning. In contrast, supervised 
algorithms—traditional algorithms or those based on DL—must have previously been 
exposed to samples and classes to classify new records. The approach presented here 
adopted a new method of employing USDL that did not use the direct output for further 
processing by the second phase. Instead, it calculated the difference between inputs and 
outputs. This dramatically reduced the number of features that had to be passed to the 
second phase to a single value rather than a vector of values. 
Reconstruction errors were passed to the second phase for clustering. Clustering is the 
classification of samples into different groups or, more precisely, the partitioning of a 
dataset into subsets (clusters) so that the data in each subset ideally share common 
characteristics. Measuring the distance between samples and the predefined cluster 
centre is a common approach used in clustering. The algorithm produces a set of 
clusters, with each cluster containing reconstruction errors that represent normal or 
abnormal records. This is eventually translated as normal and abnormal clusters by 
linking reconstruction errors back to their input records. 
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4.3 Framework Workflow and Algorithms 
Figure 4.2 depicts the framework flowchart; the first step in the workflow was to 
conduct data normalisation. The data were collected from network traffic. Each record 
represented a packet, with a typical packet containing two types of information, numeric 
or string. The initial step in normalisation was to convert non-numeric values to 
numbers that could be handled by the DL algorithm. Once the data were normalised, 
they were traversed through the autoencoder or RBM, which produced the 
corresponding output (using previously learned weights and biases). The difference 
between the input and output was calculated and then passed to the second layer for 
clustering. 
 
Figure 4.2. Detection system flowchart. 
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The final action was to place the record into one of the clusters (normal or abnormal). 
The pseudocode in Table 4.2 provides an elaborated view of the proposed system 
functionality. The algorithm processed D vector with 41 elements (number of entries in 
each packet used for the simulation), taking 𝑇𝑘 records during the training phase. The 
final output of the system is sea t of clusters C0...Cn, with each C marked as normal or 
abnormal. In the execution mode, the system initiated the model—such as weights and 
biases—during the training step. Building the model involved identifying patterns in the 
data, which was done through discovering the appropriate weights and biases through 
several sweeps of the data (sliced into batches). Internal functions for calculating and 
minimising loss were used during the model-building process. 
Table 4.2. Algorithm for Anomaly Detection 
Data: Network traffic records (continuous and digit values) (D). 
Input: t € T0..Tk where T is 1* 41 tensors and k = no. of traffic records in the normalised dataset DNT 
generated by scaling k samples of the D. 
Output: A set of clusters C0 .. Cn, where each C is normal or abnormal. 
Procedure: 
Training: 
Let EP be the number of epochs. 
Let s = batch size and no. of batches (BN) = DNT/s. 
Let i,z = 0. 
While (i < EP) do: 
For (z = 0; z < BN; z++): 
 For each t: 
Pass t through the RBM/autoencoder network. 
Calculate weights and biases after reconstruction. 
Update RBM weights (W) and biases (b) 
EP++ 
Return RBM/autoencoder trained the model with updated weights and biases. 
Testing: 
For each ts ∈ Ts where ts ∉ T 
 Pass ts through the autoencoder/RBM network 
 Calc reconstruction error (reconstruction error) tensor 
Pass ts to k-means. 
Initialisation: set K seed points randomly. 
Assign each sample to the cluster of the nearest seed point measured with a predefined distance metric. 
Calc. new centroids of the clusters of the current cluster. 
Go back to Step 2), stop when no more new assignment. 
Return: C0.. Cn of reconstruction error 
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Once the model was established, it was evaluated in the testing process. The testing 
dataset (𝑇𝑠) was a set of samples that did not belong to the training dataset (𝑇𝑘). 
Subsequently, the outputs of 𝑇𝑠 were used to calculate the reconstruction errors, with a 
vector containing a single value for each ts ∈ Ts. The vector was passed to the 
unsupervised algorithm. The algorithm in the second phase was not computationally 
expensive. The output of the second stage was a set of normal and abnormal clusters. 
4.4 Framework Design Principles 
This section introduces six principles upon which the framework was proposed. The 
first principle is a form of dimensionality reduction in which a new space (features) was 
generated from the inputs as a pre-step to isolating abnormalities. The second principle 
is the separation between a normal and an abnormal (decision). The third principle is 
resolving the dimensionality reduction in clustering. The fourth is related to the low 
number of the features in the network packets. The fifth one relates to deciding on the 
number of hidden layers. The last principle is a consideration for the issues related to 
the application domain. 
4.4.1 Dimensionality Reduction and Anomaly Detection 
Applying the unsupervised algorithm as a pre-training step is a common practice to 
enhance accuracy in many frameworks. For example, Figure 4.3 shows a classification 
framework in which a pre-training unsupervised step was included before outputs were 
passed to the SVM, which performed the classification. However, this comes at the cost 
of additional computation resources such as memory, processing and time. 
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Figure 4.3. Applying deep learning as a pre-step for support vector machine 
classification. 
One of the goals of the framework was to reduce the additional cost of computation 
simply—rather than adding a series of inputs, possibly hundreds or thousands of 
features, to the second phase, a single value was passed. 
The first stage of the proposed framework was based on the idea of dimensionality 
reduction. The concept of dimensionality reduction refers to projecting highly 
dimensioned data onto a lower subspace without significant loss of data meaning. 
Additionally, in lower dimensional data, the discrimination between normal and 
abnormal classes is evident. PCA is a dimensionality reduction algorithm that can learn 
linear relationships, while kernel PCA is a nonlinear version of the basic PCA. To learn 
nonlinear relationships, a kernel function is used to map the data to higher dimensions 
before PCA is used to reduce dimensionality.  
Figure 4.4 shows the underlying architecture of autoencoders; autoencoder algorithms 
imply dimensionality reduction as they convert data into a new representation that keeps 
most significant features (encoder) before executing a reconstruction phase (decoder). 
Various studies have compared autoencoders with PCA and its nonlinear extension, 
kernel PCA, as a dimensionality reduction algorithm. 
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Figure 4.4. Generic autoencoder architecture. 
 
Principle 1: A new space with lower dimensionality, in which normal and abnormal samples 
can be separated, may be generated from the original space. A smaller space with reduced 
dimensions is equivalent to less memory and better performance, such as classification. Models 
of smaller spaces consume less memory and runtime. 
4.4.2 Decision Boundaries 
To identify anomalies using dimensionality reduction techniques, the data sample was 
projected onto the correlation structure deduced by the algorithm. Records with 
significant reconstruction errors—relative to a predefined threshold—were marked as 
anomalies. 
A similar approach is theoretically applicable by passing the data through a trained 
model before defining a reconstruction error threshold to isolate anomalies. This was 
achievable using a single regression algorithm in the second phase. 
However, the experiments showed that reconstruction errors were not linearly separable 
using a regression algorithm or a simple threshold. Hence, the framework provided a 
nonlinear algorithm to cluster reconstruction errors. 
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4.4.3 Resolving Clustering and the Curse of Dimensionality 
The framework employed a clustering algorithm in the second phase. k-means or mean 
shift were used to group reconstruction errors. 
Reconstruction errors belonging to normal instances will be correlated enough to occur in the 
same cluster or clusters, while the same principle is valid for abnormal instances. 
A substantial reason for selecting a clustering algorithm in the second phase was to 
maintain the ability of self-learning. If no prior knowledge is required, or at least no 
complete knowledge in semi-supervised deployment, this feature conforms to zero-day 
attack detection. From a different perspective, the framework aimed to improve the 
detection accuracy of clustering algorithms using a pre-phase of data processing. This 
technique takes advantages of both worlds, such as dimensionality reduction using DL 
and the ability to detect new attacks from clustering. Additionally, k-means is a fast and 
computationally efficient algorithm. However, the curse of dimensionality has a 
significant impact on k-means. 
k-means is a standard clustering algorithm that iteratively partitions training datasets to 
learn a partition of the given dataset to produce a set of clusters. The clustering is 
produced by minimising the sum of the squared distance to its representative object in 
each cluster. As the number of features increases, the distance between any two points 
in the dataset converges. Increasing dimensionality increases sparsity. To revoke the 
curse, dimensions must be reduced—maintaining fewer features results in more 
efficient clustering. Hence, the role of the DL phase was to reduce each record to a 
single value. 
4.4.4 Network Traffic Features and Deep Learning 
DL is a data-striving algorithm that excels when there are large volumes of data. In 
cases with limited data samples or features, the model will suffer from overfitting. In 
the context of the networking domain, the packet features are limited. Additionally, 
many of the features are off. To overcome these limitations, the system follows a 
similar approach to that of the kernel PCA trick. The basic idea of the kernel trick lies in 
Vapnik-Chervonenkis’s theory: 
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Projecting the input data to higher dimensions enables greater clustering power. Increasing the 
number of neurons in the first hidden layers allows the separation of samples. 
The concept is similar to zooming into the data so that they become more separable. The 
framework presented in this thesis adopted this concept. Figure 4.6 depicts the idea of 
increasing the dimension of the input data. In the first hidden layer, the number of the 
neurons was doubled before being dramatically reduced in the following layers. The 
experiment showed improved accuracy (discussed in Chapter 6). 
 
Figure 4.5. Projecting inputs to a new higher dimension. 
4.4.5 Number of Hidden Layers and Neurons 
To decide on the number of the hidden layers, it was necessary first to identify why 
more hidden layers were needed. The answer lies in the basic purpose of the neural 
network— approximation. Feed-forward neural networks are capable of approximate 
continuous functions on a specific dataset. Theoretically, a neural network with a single 
hidden layer can be used to approximate any continued function.  
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This raises the question of whether more hidden layers are required. A neural network 
with more hidden layers (i.e. more structure) can understand the structure of the dataset. 
In the scope of this research, the main focus was on IP packet fields, enabling the 
network to find a more complex structure in the entire packet rather than in individual 
elements only. 
In practice, there is no clear recommendation for deciding on the number of hidden 
layers. However, implementation was derived from two factors: 
 A comparison of the problem with other typical domains such as the Modified 
National Institute of Standards and Technology database, the dataset for 
handwritten digits . Images are 28 x 28 = 784 pixels to be translated to 784 
neurons at the input layer. With two hidden layers, the accuracy is reasonable. 
 Experiments and trials: During the implementation, many combinations of 
different layers and neurons were tested. 
 Generalisation is the way in which the model may be generalised to new 
samples (not included in the training phase). The built model should avoid 
overfitting and underfitting. Overfitting occurs when the model is trained 
perfectly (by an increasing number of hidden layers). Underfitting occurs when 
the model has limited generalisation because of inadequate training where 
essential features are not detected. 
4.4.6 Application Considerations 
The framework adopted a semi-supervised approach. In supervised detection, the model 
is trained on labelled instances in which each record is labelled as normal or abnormal 
before entering the operation mode, which is expected to recognise unlabelled instances. 
The supervised approach suffers two limitations: first, if the system experiences 
instances that do not occur in training samples, it will fail to predict them. In network 
anomaly detection, new attacks (samples) persistently emerge. Second, the training 
sample is usually imbalanced because attacks are less frequent in network traffic, which 
negatively affects the quality of the generated model during the training. In the 
unsupervised approach, the model can identify the structure of the data. For anomaly 
detection, this approach assumes that the frequency of anomalies is lower than those 
corresponding to normal behaviour. This assumption is likely to affect detection 
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accuracy. For example, in DoS attacks, the attacker floods the system with an enormous 
number of requests; in such cases, the frequency of abnormalities may surpass regular 
traffic records. 
The framework adopted a semi-supervised approach in which the system was trained 
using a typical dataset to build the model. Subsequently, during the testing (or 
operation) mode, abnormal samples could be discriminated by the model. If the 
framework found an unprecedented pattern, it would classify it as an abnormality. This 
approach provided the following advantages: 
 Theoretically, it was capable of deciding on unprecedented attacks. 
 In the training phase, there was no need for a balanced dataset; however, the 
model tolerated abnormalities in the dataset. 
4.5 The Framework Process 
An autoencoder is a neural network consisting of two phases. An encoder is a 
deterministic mapping function (f_θ) that transforms an input vector (x) into a hidden 
representation (y): 
 f_θ (x)≈x’ 
 𝜃 = {𝐖, 𝑏}, where 𝐖 is the weight matrix and, 𝑏 is bias (8) 
A decoder reconstructs the hidden representation (y) to the reconstructed input (x’) via 
g_θ. 
The autoencoder measures the reconstruction error between x’ (reconstructed) and the 
input (x) to minimise this error (information loss): 
𝐽(𝑊) =  ∑ ||𝑥𝑛 − 𝑥
′
𝑛 || (9) 
where J(W) is the cost function to minimise the cost. 
 Arg min (𝐽(𝑊)){𝑤,𝑤′ ,𝑏,𝑏,} (10) 
where w and b are encoder weights and biases, respectively, and w’ and b’ are weights 
and biases, respectively, for the decoder. 
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Various functions such as mean squared error may be used as cost functions. For cost 
optimisation, several options, including SGD and Adam optimiser, are available. 
RBMs are energy-based models in which each feature configuration is assigned a scalar 
energy [10]. The learning process updates the energy function to ensure the shape has 
desirable properties. The probability distribution of the energy function is shown in 
Formula (11): 
 p(x) = e^(−E(x))/Z (11) 
where Z is the partitioning function, defined in (12): 
 Z= ∑ 𝒆−𝑬(𝒙)𝒗  (12) 
Boltzmann machine’s energy function is defined in (13): 
 E(x) = −x^T W x−b^T x (13) 
where W is weight matrix and b is the bias parameter. 
To enhance the RBM, hidden units were introduced. RBMs are a type of Boltzmann 
machine with restrictions on connections between visible–visible and hidden–hidden 
units. The energy function of RBMs is represented by (14): 
 E(v,h) = −b^’v−c^’h−h’Wv (14) 
where b’ and c’ are the biases for visible and hidden units, respectively, and W is the 
weight of connections between hidden and visible units. 
The autoencoder was implemented with an input layer equal to the length of the input 
vector. Several layers were added to the encoder. Weight matrices were defined to 
construct connections between each layer and its subsequent layer. For the decoder, the 
output of the encoder (final hidden layer) was the input for the decoder, followed by a 
series of hidden layers with associated weight matrices. Data were passed to the 
framework as a single dimensional vector in which each element in the array 
represented a single feature. The input data were sliced into batches. For each input 
vector, the encoder used the activation function to define neuron status. Functions such 
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as sigmoid, tanh or ReLu are operable by autoencoders. The activation function was 
applied to each layer. The sigmoid function used the weight matrix, input vector and 
bias vector as inputs, with outputs in the sigmoid function being either 0 or 1 for each 
neuron. The encoder used the same activation function to reconstruct the input from the 
final layer in the encoder. The main goal of the autoencoder was to rebuild a similar 
version of the input with minimal error, where the error does not equal zero. Otherwise, 
the model would suffer a generalisation problem. After reconstruction, the model 
measured the distance between the input and the output. Several functions were utilised 
to find the distance or reconstruction error. For example, mean squared error calculated 
the summation of squared difference for each neuron in the input and its corresponding 
neuron in the output, divided by the number of neurons in one vector. 
The model used an optimiser to adapt weights and biases to reduce reconstruction 
errors. For example, the Adam optimiser combined RMSProp and SGD to store an 
exponentially decaying average of past squared gradients and an exponentially decaying 
average of past gradients. 
Through several epochs, the model reconstructed and optimised until the network had 
been established (experimentally). The next step was to pass the reconstruction error to 
the second phase. The reconstruction errors were stored in a one-dimensional array and 
were input to a clustering algorithm such as k-means. k-means initialised the cluster 
centres randomly before allocating each reconstruction error to the nearest cluster. The 
distance was measured using specific functions such as Euclidean distance. Then, it 
calculated the new centre for each cluster by minimising the sum of the squared distance 
of its elements. 
A similar reconstruction procedure was conducted for RBMs; however, RBMs involved 
different steps following the reconstruction. 
Activations were combined with individual weights and biases. Results were passed to 
the visible layer. The RBM reconstructed data by making several forward and backward 
passes between the visible and hidden layers. Samples from probabilistic tensor selected 
the input in the reconstruction phase. The same weight matrix and visible layer biases 
were used for the sigmoid function. The output produced was a reconstruction, which 
approximated the original input. 
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RBM as an energy-based probabilistic model defines a probability distribution as: 
 p(v) = ∑ 𝑷(𝒗, 𝒉) = ∑
𝒆−𝑬(𝒗,𝒉)
𝒁𝒉𝒉
where Z = ∑ 𝒆−𝑭(𝒗)𝒗   (15) 
where F(v) is the free energy function = −𝒍𝒐𝒈 ∑ 𝒆−𝑬(𝒗,𝒉)𝒉  
 p(v) = ∑ 𝑷(𝒗, 𝒉) = ∑
𝒆−𝑬(𝒗,𝒉)
∑ 𝒆−𝒍𝒐𝒈 ∑ 𝒆
−𝑬(𝒗,𝒉)
𝒉𝒗
𝒉𝒉  (16) 
An energy-based model can be learned by performing SGD on the empirical negative 
log-likelihood of the training data, where the log-likelihood and the loss function are: 
 𝐿(𝜃,  𝑉) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝(𝑣𝑖)𝑣𝑖𝜖𝑉      and     𝑙(𝜃, 𝑉) = −𝐿(𝜃,  𝑉)  (17) 
Then, the data negative log-likelihood gradient has the following form: 
 −
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
=
𝑑𝐹(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
− ∑ 𝑝(?̃?)?̃?
𝑑𝐹(?̃?)
𝑑𝜃
 (18) 
 −
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
=
𝑑𝐹(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
−
1
|𝑁|
∑ 𝑝(?̃?)?̃?𝜖𝑁
𝑑𝐹(?̃?)
𝑑𝜃
 (19) 
where v’ is a sample of N. 
To minimise loss, we must maximise the product of probabilities assigned to the 
training set dF(v)/dθ: 
 P(v) = −𝑏′𝑣 − 𝑐′ℎ − ℎ′𝑊𝑣 or 𝐹(𝑣) = −𝑏′𝑣 − ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∑ 𝑒ℎ𝑖(𝑐𝑖+𝑊𝑖𝑣)ℎ𝑖𝑖  (20) 
where E(v,h) = −b^’ v-c^’ h-h^’ Wv and b’ and c, are biases. 
From (19) and (20): 
 −dlog(p(v))/(dW_ij ) = E_v [p(h_i│v)∙v_j ]-v_j^((i) )∙σ(W_i∙v^((i) )+c_i ) (21) 
Formula (21) defines the loss function as the average negative log-likelihood, with the 
objective being to minimise it. To achieve this, we needed the partial derivative of this 
function with respect to all its parameters. From Formula (21), optimisation or 
minimising loss depended on adjusting the weights (W) and biases (C). SGDs were 
used to find the optimal W tensor. 
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The derivation had two terms. The first  term is the positive term E_v [p(h_i│v)∙v_j ], 
which depended on the data (v) and increased the probability of the inputs. The second 
was the negative term −v_j^((i) )∙σ(W_i∙v^((i) )+c_i ), which depended on the model 
and decreased the probability of the output generated by the model. 
The positive phase increased the probability of training data. 
The negative phase decreased the probability of samples generated by the model. 
The negative phase was difficult to compute; therefore, we used a method known as 
contrastive divergence (CD) to approximate it. It was designed in such a way that the 
direction of the gradient estimate was somewhat accurate, even when the size was not 
(in real-world models, more accurate techniques such as CD-k or PCD are used to train 
RBMs). During the calculation of CD, we used Gibbs sampling to sample from our 
model distribution. 
CD is a matrix of values that were computed and used to adjust the values of the W 
matrix. Changing W incrementally led to the training of W values. Subsequently, at 
each step (or epoch), W was updated to the new value W’ using the following equation: 
 W’ = W+alpha∗CDW’ = W+alpha∗CD (22) 
Here, alpha is some small step rate, also known as the ‘learning rate’. 
4.6 Framework for Software-Defined Networks 
This section discusses the integration of the proposed detection system in the SDN 
model. The actual integration is beyond the scope of this research. Multiple intrusion 
detection applications have been developed to detect malicious activities in SDN 
networks. For example, the ODL controller uses the Defense4All application to detect 
and mitigate DDoS attacks. However, the application does not protect the controller 
itself; rather, it deploys a set of rules to protect the network at its edges. In the event of 
malicious activity, the Defense4All application requests network information from the 
controller and acts through its attack mitigation module. Security limitations of this 
application include the following: 
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 The application must first communicate with the controller to gather statistics 
and raw data used by the IDS to decide whether an activity is malicious. 
Consequently, the controller is exposed to the threat before the decision is made. 
 The controller’s location in the architecture makes it vulnerable to new types of 
attacks that require novel mechanisms. For example, mechanisms to ensure 
security in communications between the controller and the IDS should be 
present. 
 Controller software may be prone to traditional software vulnerabilities, which 
require advanced detection techniques such as deep packet inspection. 
Figure 4.6 shows the deployment of the proposed system. Integrating the IDS as an 
extension of the controller plane provided the following advantages: 
 Centralisation: Figure 4.6 shows the deployment of classical IDS dispersing over 
the network, where it protects a network portion or set of them. The proposed 
architecture takes advantage of the centralisation feature of SDN, in which the 
proposed IDS has a global view of the entire network. This deployment protects 
higher, lower and control planes. Compared to the deployment of IDS in 
conventional networks shown in figure 4.7, the proposed deployment offer 
global view and centralisation, which boost the performance. 
 
Figure 4.6. Deployment of intrusion detection systems in software-defined network 
architecture. 
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 In extensibility scenarios, where the IDS is responsible for attacks, its 
positioning at the control plane mitigates threat propagation. 
 The deployment protects the controller itself because the IDS is deployed as a 
plug-in that works with the controller, rather than as a component managed by 
the controller. 
 
Figure 4.7. Deployment of intrusion detection systems in traditional networks. 
For instance, ODL provides a model-driven service abstraction layer through which 
new functions can be added to the controller. 
4.7 Framework Features 
We proposed a framework based on DL for attack detection in network traffic. We 
investigated various aspects of applying DL for network anomaly detection. This 
research focused on unsupervised algorithms because they have the potential to detect 
novel attacks. We provided a comparative study of autoencoders and RBMs. Given that 
it is not possible to use USDL as a standalone for anomaly detection, we adapted 
algorithms for anomaly detection purposes. The proposed detection framework 
consisted of two phases: the first phase was based on unsupervised DL algorithms, 
while in the second phase, the outputs were forwarded to a simple clustering machine 
learning algorithm. Two unsupervised DL algorithms were used to demonstrate 
prediction accuracy. Therefore, the framework provided the following advantages: 
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 Proposed and implemented a threat detection framework: The framework was 
applicable to different networking models, including conventional networks, 
SDN and IoT. 
 The framework provided a method of solving the problem of classical clustering 
algorithms such as k-means, which performs poorly in high-dimensional data. 
The use of unsupervised DL as a step to reduce dimensionality dramatically 
enhanced the accuracy of k-means. 
 The framework adopted the reconstruction errors produced from the DL 
algorithms as a boundary decision for anomaly detection instead of applying the 
unsupervised algorithms as a pre-training step only. However, the decision did 
not rely on a simple regression procedure; a clustering approach was adopted as 
reconstruction errors are not linearly separable. 
 Compared the accuracy of two major unsupervised DL algorithms: RBMs and 
autoencoders. The analysis shows the framework achieved an accuracy of over 
99% with the integration of the autoencoder and the k-means. 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter introduced a framework for network anomaly detection. The framework 
employed USDL in the first phase and k-means or mean a shift in the second phase. 
Several related works have used deep learning to reveal anomalies in network traffic. 
This chapter provided a theoretical foundation for the framework implementation. This 
foundation defined six design principals. The design principals consider the 
requirements for the network anomalies identification. The small number of features in 
network traffic packets represents one of the obstacles for deep learning as it shines with 
massive data. To tackle this problem, an approach similar to kernel trick is used with 
autoencoders, where the inputs are projected on a higher dimension. Also, this chapter 
has introduced some new criteria, in place of the threshold, to distinguish the normal 
from the abnormal, where it is not accurate to consider the absolute reconstruction error 
for that distinction.  
The chapter has also discussed the ways for deciding the number of hidden layers and 
the number of neurons at each layer. The limitations of the inputs derived from the 
number of features in each packet imposes represents a challenge to use deep learning 
algorithms.  
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 The chapter discussed the potential of applying DL as a pre-training phase to reduce 
dimensionality. Dimensionality reduction is an essential step to improve the detection 
accuracy of network anomaly detection. The research focused on unsupervised 
algorithms because they are more likely to detect new threats. The study focused on 
autoencoders. The chapter presented a set of principles used in the design process, 
including dimensionality reduction and the use of reconstruction errors for the decision. 
Additionally, the chapter discussed the integration of the framework into the SDN 
networking model. 
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Chapter 5: Simulation Studies 
This chapter provides the implementation of the framework proposed in the previous 
chapter. The implementation included four scenarios—for each scenario, the first phase 
used a DL algorithm, either an autoencoder or an RBM, and the second phase used a 
clustering algorithm, either k-means or mean shift. This chapter introduces the required 
tools and libraries and provides an in-depth discussion of the dataset, feature selection 
and normalisation procedures. The chapter presents the critical code snippets required 
for the framework and how the code is related to workflow and algorithms provided in 
Chapter 4. Additionally, a detailed description is provided for training, testing and 
tracking the data lifecycle during the execution. 
The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section introduces the simulation 
goals and generic descriptions of the simulation procedures. The second section outlines 
the various simulation scenarios. The third section presents the DL tools and various 
Python modules used for coding. The fourth section is an in-depth discussion of the 
dataset and its limitations and rationale for using it in the simulation. The fifth section, 
which is divided into two subsections representing each of the scenarios, maps the 
framework design to implementation. The final section provides a chapter summary and 
conclusion. 
5.1 Simulation Overview 
The proposed anomaly detection framework was based on unsupervised DL. The 
framework utilised USDL in a semi-supervised mode in which labelled normal traffic 
was passed through the framework in the training phase. During the testing phase, both 
normal and abnormal traffic was passed through the framework—because the 
framework could detect normal traffic, we could classify the other samples as abnormal. 
The simulation aimed to: 
 implement the proposed detection framework using a state-of-the-art DL library, 
Google TensorFlow 
 implement an autoencoder and an RBM in the context of networking anomaly 
detection 
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 experimentally evaluate the application of USDL algorithms for network 
anomaly detection 
 compare the accuracy of autoencoders and RBMs in different scenarios. 
5.1.1 Simulation Scenarios 
The simulation was conducted in two main scenarios based on autoencoders and RBMs, 
respectively. In each scenario, there were two sub-scenarios. The main scenarios 
involved the implementation of the algorithms for autoencoders and RBMs. The sub-
scenarios used two different simple classical algorithms, k-means and mean shift 
algorithms, at the second phase for clustering. The scenarios occurred as follows: 
1. Autoencoder phase followed by k-means clustering 
2. Autoencoder phase followed by mean shift clustering 
3. RBM phase followed by k-means clustering 
4. RBM phase followed by mean shift clustering. 
The purpose of using different clustering algorithms in the second phase was to ensure 
the accuracy of the DL algorithm results. Figure 5.1 depicts the flowchart for the first 
scenario involving autoencoder and k-means. The other scenarios had the same flow. 
 
Figure 5.1. Simulation scenarios flowchart. 
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Each of the scenarios included the following process: 
 Data normalisation: converted the dataset to a specific numerical format 
processable by the USDL algorithm 
 Application of USDL: combined the training and testing phases as well as 
several sub-processes depending on the type of the algorithm; however, the 
necessary process included calculating weights, outputs, loss and optimisation 
 Clustering of the reconstruction error (loss): included the application of a simple 
clustering procedure to a one-dimensional array of inputs. 
5.2 Simulation Tools: TensorFlow and SciKit 
TensorFlow was developed by Google’s Brain research team as an open-source 
framework for machine learning research and industrial applications [23]. It focuses on 
current trends in machine learning, specifically DL. TensorFlow takes its name from 
neural networks operations—any neural network consists of creating tensors 
(multidimensional arrays) for input, weights, biases and output. Computations are done 
in a graph model—graphs consist of nodes (operations for example activation functions 
and optimisation) and edges (data for example inputs and biases). In this simulation, we 
used TensorFlow for two reasons: 
 TensorFlow, based on GitHub statistics and Stack Overflow, is the most widely 
used framework in DL [146]. 
 TensorFlow provides basic support for both algorithms: autoencoders and 
RBMs. 
In all simulation scenarios, DL algorithms were developed using TensorFlow libraries. 
SciKit is the source Python library for data mining and analysis [147]. SciKit was used 
to implement the clustering algorithms (i.e. k-means and mean shift). 
5.3 Dataset 
KDD99 is the most widely used dataset in machine learning and intrusion detection. 
The dataset represents real collected network traffic data. The dataset includes 
4,898,431 traffic records for training and 311,029 records for testing [148]. 
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Table 5.1. KDD99 Input Features 
Feature Name Description Type 
Duration Length (number of seconds) of the connection Continuous 
Protocol type Type of protocol, e.g. TCP, UDP, etc. Discrete 
Service Network service on the destination, e.g., HTTP, telnet, etc. Discrete 
src_bytes Number of data bytes from source to destination Continuous 
dst_bytes Number of data bytes from destination to source Continuous 
flag Normal or error status of the connection Discrete 
land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise Discrete 
wrong_fragment Number of ‘wrong’ fragments Continuous 
urgent Number of urgent packets Continuous 
hot Number of ‘hot’ indicators Continuous 
num_failed_logins Number of failed login attempts Continuous 
logged_in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise Discrete 
num_compromised Number of ‘compromised’ conditions Continuous 
root_shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise Discrete 
su_attempted 1 if ‘su root’ command attempted; 0 otherwise Discrete 
num_root Number of ‘roots’ accessed Continuous 
num_file_creations Number of file creation operations Continuous 
num_shells Number of shell prompts Continuous 
num_access_files Number of operations on access control files Continuous 
num_outbound_cmds Number of outbound commands in an FTP session Continuous 
is_hot_login 1 if the login belongs to the ‘hot’ list; 0 otherwise Discrete 
is_guest_login 1 if the login is a ‘guest’ login; 0 otherwise Discrete 
Count 
Note: The following features refer to these same-host 
connections 
Continuous 
serror_rate % of connections that have ‘SYN’ errors Continuous 
rerror_rate % of connections that have ‘REJ’ errors Continuous 
same_srv_rate % Of connections to the same service Continuous 
diff_srv_rate % Of connections to different services Continuous 
srv_count 
Number of connections to the same service as the current 
connection in the past two seconds 
Continuous 
srv_serror_rate % of connections that have ‘SYN’ errors Continuous 
srv_rerror_rate % of connections that have ‘REJ’ errors Continuous 
srv_diff_host_rate % Of connections to different hosts Continuous 
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The dataset contained four types of attacks: 
 DoS attacks: Attackers exhaust target resources, such as computations and 
memory, by flooding the target host with an enormous number of requests; the 
victim host denies legitimate requests. 
 User to root attacks: Privilege escalation attacks in which the user obtains access 
(usually legitimate), then escalates access to the root role, where the attacker has 
full access to the compromised system. 
 Remote to local attacks: The attacker exploits application/system vulnerabilities 
to gain access to the system. 
 Probing attacks: Reconnaissance attacks in which the intruder gathers 
information about the system, such as open ports, operating systems and various 
versions of protocols and applications. 
Table 5.2. KDD99 Dataset Statistics 
Class Training set 
Normal 97,278 
Probe 41,102 
Denial-of-service 3,883,370 
Remote to local 1,126 
User to root 5,252 
Total 4,898,431 
KDD99 is extensively used in intrusion detection research. However, it has been 
heavily criticised [148]. One of the significant issues associated with KDD99 is data 
redundancy. During the training, records were selected randomly, and testing samples 
were selected manually from different locations within the file to avoid redundancy. 
Additionally, redundancy is one of the causes of highly correlated data problems, which 
is discussed in the following chapter. However, the use of KDD99 was not avoidable in 
this research because most related work has been benchmarked to this dataset. 
A sample data record is shown below: 
0,tcp,http,SF,181,5450,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,8,8,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,1.00,0.00,0
.00,9,9,1.00,0.00,0.11,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,0.00,normal 
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Records were labelled as either normal or abnormal—these labels were used for result 
validation, specifically to identify the number of normal and abnormal records in each 
identified cluster. 
The data in its original format was not calculable because the algorithms processed 
numerical data only; hence, it was subjected to data normalisation processing. 
Normalisation was conducted in two steps. The first step was to replace discreet fields 
with continuous fields: 
pdic = {1:’domain_u’, 2:’systat’, 3:’tftp_u’, 4:’link’, 5:’nnsp’, 6:’sql_net’,7:’netbios_dgm’, 8:’courier’, 9:’uucp’, 
10:’ftp_data’, 11:’time’, 12:’gopher’, 13:’mtp’, 14:’nntp’, 15:’telnet’, 16:’finger’, 17:’echo’,18:’imap4’, 19:’pop_2’, 
20:’other’, 21:’netbios_ns’, 22:’private’, 23:’netstat’, 24:’shell’,25:’eco_i’, 26:’kshell’, 27:’domain’, 28:’discard’, 
29:’efs’, 30:’tim_i’, 31:’ldap’, 32:’hostnames’, 33:’printer’, 34:’supdup’, 35:’pm_dump’,36:’auth’, 37:’IRC’, 
38:’iso_tsap’, 39:’netbios_ssn’, 40:’ntp_u’, 41:’harvest’, 42:’Z39_50’, 43:’smtp’,44: ‘pop_3’, 45:’aol’, 46:’ecr_i’, 
47:’csnet_ns’, 48:’whois’, 49:’ftp’, 50:’remote_job’, 51:’X11’, 52:’sunrpc’, 53:’urh_i’, 54:’vmnet’, 55:’http’, 
56:’urp_i’,57: ‘rje’, 58:’login’, 59:’ssh’, 60:’http_443’, 61:’klogin’, 62:’uucp_path’, 63:’http_8001’, 64:’ctf’, 
65:’daytime’, 66:’name’, 67:’http_2784’, 68:’red_i’, 69:’bgp’, 70:’exec’, 71:’icmp’} 
rdic = {v: k for k, v in pdic.items()} 
pro.append (tmp[4]) 
tmp[4] = rdic[tmp[4]] 
sdic = {‘S2’:1, ‘finger’:2, ‘X11’:3, ‘Z39_50’:4, ‘exec’:5, ‘courier’:6, ‘netstat’:7, ‘csnet_ns’:8, ‘ecr_i’:9, ‘private’:10, 
‘nnsp’:11, ‘hostnames’:12, ‘iso_tsap’:13, ‘ntp_u’:14, ‘ftp_data’:15, ‘name’:16, ‘discard’:17, ‘uucp_path’:18, ‘S3’:19, 
‘smtp’:20, ‘SH’:21, ‘RSTOS0’:22, ‘ctf’:23, ‘ldap’:24, ‘urh_i’:25, ‘uucp’:26, ‘shell’:27, ‘echo’:28, ‘systat’:29, 
‘http_443’:30, ‘red_i’:31, ‘urp_i’:32, ‘netbios_dgm’:33, ‘aol’:34, ‘pm_dump’:35, ‘RSTO’:36, ‘whois’:37, 
‘domain_u’:38, ‘bgp’:39, ‘time’:40, ‘netbios_ssn’:41, ‘tim_i’:42, ‘other’:43, ‘pop_2’:44, ‘OTH’:45, ‘kshell’:46, ‘ftp’:47, 
‘link’:48, ‘imap4’:49, ‘rje’:50, ‘sunrpc’:51, ‘RSTR’:52, ‘domain’:53, ‘harvest’:54, ‘REJ’:55, ‘supdup’:56, ‘http_2784’:57, 
‘tftp_u’:58, ‘http_8001’:59, ‘SF’:60, ‘sql_net’:61, ‘vmnet’:62, ‘gopher’:63, ‘http’:64, ‘S0’:65, ‘ssh’:66, ‘IRC’:67, 
‘nntp’:68, ‘netbios_ns’:69, ‘remote_job’:70, ‘S1’:71, ‘login’:72, ‘telnet’:73, ‘mtp’:74, ‘eco_i’:75, ‘efs’:76, ‘klogin’:77, 
‘pop_3’:78, ‘daytime’:79, ‘printer’:80, ‘auth’:81} 
tmp[5] = sdic[tmp[5]] 
pro.append(tmp[5]) 
tmp.pop() 
ntmp = tmp[2:] 
or z in range(len(ntmp)): 
ntmp[z] = float (ntmp[z]) 
ntmp.insert(0, str (tmp[0])) 
ntmp.insert(1, str(tmp[1])) 
st = “ “.join(str(x) for x in ntmp) 
row.append(st) 
print (len(row[2])) 
print ((row[2:10])) 
print (len(row)) 
with open(‘c:\\Tsoutfile.txt’, mode=‘wt’, encoding=‘utf-8’) as myfile: 
for lines in row: 
print(lines, file = myfile) 
myfile.close() 
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For example, the second field service type was replaced by the following values. A 
Python script was written to sweep the training and testing data to find all continuous 
values and replace them with numeric values: 
1.0 55.0 60.0 215.0 45076.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The second step was to scale the entire record to values in [0, 1]—for each field, the 
maximum value in the entire dataset was found, then all fields were divided by the 
maximum value. The record below is a sample of the final normalised data: 
0.0 0.0 0.33 0.77 0.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
0.03 0.03 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.63 1.0 0.0 0.04 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The primary reason for scaling the data between 0 and 1 was the choice of activation 
function. The activation function used in the model implementation was sigmoid, which 
facilitated the normalisation of the input and improved the experimental results. 
Normalisation at this stage was performed using another Python script, which swept the 
entire dataset to find the largest value in each field, then divided the field in the entire 
dataset by the heights value as show below: 
maxval2 = [66366.0, 3.0, 71.0, 71.0, 62825648.0, 32317698.0, 1.0, 3.0, 6.0, 233.0, 5.0, 1.0, 942.0, 1.0, 
2.0, 1013.0, 100.0, 5.0, 7.0, 0.0, 1.0, 1.0, 511.0, 511.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 255.0, 255.0, 1.0, 
1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, 1.0] 
maxval = maxlist(maxval1,maxval2) 
with open(‘c:\\Troutfile.txt’,’r’) as f2, open(‘c:\\Troutfileb.txt’,’w’) as f : 
for line in f2: 
 fieldsx = line.split()    # parse the columns 
 fields = ieldsx[4:] 
 intro = fieldsx[0:4] 
 rowdata = [float(i) for i in fields] # convert text to numbers 
 if len(data) = 0: 
 data = rowdata 
 normls = divlist(rowdata,maxval ) # accumulate the results 
 rec = intro + normls 
 st = " ".join([str(i) for i in rec]) 
 print(st, file = f) 
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5.4 Scenario Implementation 
The first phase in the proposed framework included the unsupervised DL algorithm for 
dimensionality reduction. Autoencoders and RBMs were chosen for two reasons: first, 
unsupervised DL can be classified as two main categories, non-probabilistic models and 
probabilistic (generative) models. The two algorithms selected represent both 
categories. Additionally, both algorithms have been used in many extensions—for 
example, autoencoder has been used in stacked, sparse and denoising autoencoders, and 
RBM has been used in deep belief networks and conditional and gated RBMs. As part 
of the analytical study, a comparison of both algorithms in the domain of network 
anomaly detection was conducted. In the following subsection, the detailed 
implementation is demonstrated using TensorFlow and other Python libraries. The 
demonstration includes model building, activation and optimisation functions. 
5.4.1 Scenarios 1 and 2 
Autoencoders are a neural network with symmetric input and output layers with respect 
to the number of neurons. Several hidden layers are added between the input and output 
layers. Scenario 1 was divided into two parts: the first contained the input and number 
of hidden layers (encoders), and the second contained the output and the same number 
of the hidden layers in the encoder. The number of neurons in each layer was identical 
to the number in the encoder. Additionally, the final layer in the encoder was the first 
used for the decoder. 
In this implementation, the encoder included two layers after the input layer: 
X = tf.placeholder(“float”) [None, 41]) 
Placeholder is a variable that created a tensor that was subsequently populated, allowing 
the creation of the model without the actual data. Once the model was built, then the 
data were inserted into it. X is a TensorFlow tensor variable used to load the 41 features 
of a single IP packet from the KDD99 dataset; the float defined the valid data types to 
be inserted: 
Encoder: 
def encoder(x): 
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 layer_1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.add(tf.matmul(x, weights[‘encoder_h1’]), 
  biases[‘encoder_b1’])) 
 # Encoder second layer with sigmoid activation #2 
 layer_2 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.add(tf.matmul(layer_1, weights[‘encoder_h2’]), 
  biases[‘encoder_b2’])) 
 return layer_2 
The autoencoder consisted of two parts: the encoder, the main goal of which was to find 
the most important features in the data, and the decoder, the main goal of which was to 
reconstruct the original data with minimum error. Each phase contained a series of 
latent layers, which should be symmetric around the middle layer, which is the last in 
the encoder and the input for the decoder. Figure 5.2 depicts the internal structure of the 
autoencoder—the red part represents the encoder, while the green represents the 
decoder. 
For the implementation, we deployed two hidden layers, n_hidden_1 and n_hidden_2, 
for 20 and five neurons, respectively. The following chapter provides a more detailed 
rationale for the number of neurons in hidden layers, with a comparative analysis of the 
results of different implementations. 
Figure 5.2. The internal structure of the autoencoder intrusion detection system. 
The second hidden layer contained five neurons, which represented the most significant 
features in the data. W represents the weight tensor, which connected the input layer 
with the first layer and biases for the first layer. In this implementation, there were four 
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weight tensors linking each layer to the following shown in Figure 5.2: ‘encoder_h1’, 
coder_b2’, ‘decoder_h1’ and ‘decoder_h2’. The dimension of each tensor was 
calculated by multiplying the number of neurons in each layer; for instance, 
‘encoder_h1’ = 41*20, with each value representing the connection weight between two 
corresponding nodes. Similar to weights, bias tensors were created for each layer: 
’encoder_b1’, ‘encoder_b2’, ‘decoder_b1’ and ‘decoder_b2. 
The encoder used sigmoid as the activation function. Prior to calculating the activation 
value, the tensors of two layers were multiplied using tf.matmul( ), biases were added 
using tf.add(), then outputs were activation using tf.nn.sigmoid(). Once the output layer 
was calculated, the cost or information loss was calculated by measuring the difference 
between the input layer and the output layer: tf.reduce_mean(tf.square(input,output)). 
n_hidden_1 = 20 
n_hidden_2 = 5 
Two weight variables for the two layers and two bias tensors were present. 
Weights = { 
 ‘encoder_h1’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_input, n_hidden_1])) 
 ‘encoder_h2’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_hidden_1, n_hidden_2])) 
 ‘decoder_h1’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_hidden_2, n_hidden_1])) 
 ‘decoder_h2’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_hidden_1, n_input])) 
Biases = { 
 ‘encoder_b1’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_hidden_1])) 
 ‘encoder_b2’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_hidden_2])) 
 ‘decoder_b1’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_hidden_1])) 
 ‘decoder_b2’: tf.Variable(tf.random_normal([n_input])) 
The decoder phase used Layer 2 from the encoder as the input and reconstructed the 
output in two layers: the first layer contained 20 neurons and the second (final) layer 
was the output layer. Hence, weights and biases were updated when the Adam optimiser 
was used. The Adam optimiser is an efficient version of the SGD optimiser. 
The model optimised the cost using tf.train.AdamOptimizer(1e-1).minimize(cost) 
def decoder(x): 
 layer_1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.add(tf.matmul(x, weights[‘decoder_h1’]) 
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  biases[‘decoder_b1’])) 
 layer_2 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.add(tf.matmul(layer_1, weights[‘decoder_h2’]) 
  biases[‘decoder_b2’])) 
 return layer_2 
cost = tf.reduce_mean(tf.square(y_true - y_pred)) 
optimiser = tf.train.AdamOptimizer(1e-1).minimize(cost) 
5.4.2 Training 
Once the model was built, the next step was to load the data, divide the data into batches 
and then run the session. Data loading was done in two steps: the first step was to read 
the data from the KDD99 dataset file and store it in an array using the following code: 
reader_train = create_reader(train_file, True, input_dim, 2) 
print (type(reader_train)) 
print (“all”) 
packet = C.input_variable(input_dim) 
packet_label = C.input_variable(2) 
batch_size = 400000 
viz_input_map = { 
 packet: reader_train.streams.features 
 packet_label : reader_train.streams.labels_viz 
viz_data = reader_train.next_minibatch(batch_size 
  input_map = viz_input_map) 
flow_data = viz_data[packet].asarray() 
flow_type = viz_data[packet_label].asarray() 
trax = np.array (flow_data ) 
Xtrain = [] 
Ytrain = [] 
Yhashed = [] 
for i in trax: 
 elem = i[0].tolist() 
 Xtrain.append(elem) 
Xtrain = np.asarray(Xtrain).astype(‘float32’) 
Each record of the 400 k element was converted to an array and added to the training 
data array, Xtrain. The data were divided into batches (total_batches) before being fed 
into the model: 
sess.run([optimizer, cost], feed_dict={X: batch_xs} 
for i in range(total_batch): 
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 batch_xs = Xtrain[i*batch_size:(i*batch_size + batch_size)] 
 _, c = sess.run([optimizer, cost], feed_dict={X: batch_xs}) 
Once the model was established by calculating optimal weights and biases, a block of 
the testing data was loaded from KDD99 and passed through the autoencoder: 
reader_test = create_reader(test_file, True, input_dim, 2) 
 print (type(reader_test)) 
 print ("alll") 
 packet = C.input_variable(input_dim) 
 packet_label = C.input_variable(2) 
 batch_size = 1300 
 viz_input_map_t = { 
 packet: reader_test.streams.features, 
 packet_label: reader_test.streams.labels_viz 
 } 
 viz_data_t = reader_test.next_minibatch(batch_size, input_map = viz_input_map_t) 
 flow_data_t = viz_data_t[packet].asarray() 
 flow_type_t = viz_data_t[packet_label].asarray() 
 tray = np.array (flow_data_t ) 
 Ytrain = [] 
 Ltst= [] 
 ltest = np.array (flow_type_t ) 
 for i in tray: 
 elem = i[0].tolist() 
 Ytrain.append(elem) 
 for i in ltest: 
 elem = i[0].tolist() 
Ltst.append(elem) 
 Ytrain = np.asarray(Ytrain).astype(‘float32’) 
 Ltst = np.asarray(Ltst).astype(‘float32’) 
encode_decode = sess.run(y_pred, feed_dict={X: Ytrain2}) 
for i in range(len(encode_decode)): 
err2.append(sess.run(tf.reduce_mean(tf.squared_difference(encode_decode[i], 
Ytrain2[i])))) 
The testing samples were inserted in the TensorFlow graph for encoding and decoding: 
sess.run(y_pred, feed_dict={X: Ytrain2}). The test data were reconstructed using the 
autoencoder, then reconstruction errors were calculated using 
tf.squared_difference(encode_decode[i] ,Ytrain2[i]) for each record in the testing batch. 
For instance, in the previous code, 1.3 k samples were loaded; by the end of the 
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processing of the first phase, there were 1.3 k reconstruction errors. These 
reconstruction errors were forwarded to the next phase. In this scenario, a k-means 
algorithm was implemented using the following code: 
km = KMeans() 
cl = km.fit(npar.reshape(-1,1)) 
print(cl.labels_) 
print (type(cl.labels_)) 
kcls = [(x,y) for x , y in zip (tst , cl.labels_ )] 
 
gcl = list(set(cl.labels_)) 
 
print(gcl) 
groups = [] 
for c in gcl: 
 clx = [i for i,x in enumerate(cl.labels_) if x == c] 
 groups.append(clx) 
k-means is a class in the SciKit library. The fit () function took the reconstruction error 
array as input and calculated the labels for each sample. Once the k-means labels were 
calculated, a verification code was sent to link the original labels (normal or abnormal) 
with the labels. 
In the second scenario, the k-means phase was replaced with mean shift. The mean shift 
used in this scenario was a flat-based kernel similar to PCA. However, the 
reconstruction errors were simple vectors where the samples were separable; therefore, 
using the kernels would have complicated the computation. 
kclusters = [] 
for i in groups: 
 cla = [list(tst[x]) for x in i ] 
 kclusters.append(cla) 
for i in kclusters: 
 nrm = 0 
 abnr=0 
 for x in i 
 if (x[0] == 1.0) and (x[1] == 0.0): 
  nrm= nrm + 1 
 otherwise: 
  abnr = abnr + 1 
 print(" KCluster normal") 
 print(" KCluster abnormal") 
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The code below depicts the implementation of the mean shift. The mean shift is a 
centroid-based algorithm, with the main goal to find the modes in smooth data, to 
calculate the probability distribution function. 
Z = np.array(list(zip(err,np.zeros(len(err))))) 
ms = MeanShift( bin_seeding=True) 
ms.fit(Z) 
labels = ms.labels_ 
cluster_centers = ms.cluster_centers_ 
labels_unique = np.unique(labels) 
n_clusters_ = len(labels_unique) 
mycls= [] 
for k in range(n_clusters_): 
 my_members = labels == k 
 #print ("cluster {0}: {1}".format(k, X[my_members, 0])) 
 mycls.append(list(Z[my_members, 0])) 
5.4.3 Scenarios 3 and 4 
An RBM network consists of two layers: the input layer, which is visible, and a hidden 
layer. Each record in the KDD99 dataset has 41 features. Hence, the RBM visible layer 
has the same number of input neurons. 
The hidden layer possesses n neurons. Each hidden unit has a binary state, which we 
call sn, and it turns either 0 or 1 with a probability that is a sigmoid function: 
𝑓(𝑥) =
1
1 + 𝑒−𝑥
 
where x is the visible neuron (v0), corresponding weight (w) and hidden bias (hb). 
tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(v0, W) + hb) # calculating sn for hidden units probabilities of 
the hidden units. 
Each neuron in the visible layer (v) also has a bias (vb). W is a matrix representing the 
weights between the input layer and hidden layer nodes. In the weight matrix, the rows 
are equal to the visible nodes and the columns are equal to the hidden nodes. Let W be 
the tensor of 41*82, where 82 is the number of neurons in the hidden layers: 
vb = tf.placeholder ("float", [41])  # visible layer biases 
hb = tf.placeholder("float", [41]) #Hidden Layer biases 
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W = tf.placeholder("float", [41,41]) # weights matrix 
v0 = tf.placeholder("float", [None, 41])  # visible layer tensor 
Inputs were combined with individual weights and bias. Some hidden nodes were 
activated. 
 
Figure 5.3. Restricted Boltzmann machine neuron activation. 
_h0 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(v0, W) + hb) 
h0 = tf.nn.relu(tf.sign(_h0 - tf.random_uniform(tf.shape(_h0)))) 
Figure 5.3 show the activation of RBM mpdel, the activations were combined with 
individual weights and a bias. Results were passed to the visible layer. The RBM 
reconstructed data by making several forward and backward passes between the visible 
and hidden layers as shown in figure 5.4. 
𝑉1 
 
𝑉2 
 
ℎ2 
 
ℎ1 
 
ℎ3 
 
W1 
 
W2 
 
𝑣𝑏 
 
Input, weights, and biases pass to the hidden layer 
through the logical function 
𝑉1 
 
𝑉2 
 
ℎ2 
 
ℎ1 
 
ℎ3 
 
W1 
 
W2 
 
𝑣𝑏 
 
h1 activated 
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Figure 5.4. Reconstruction phase. 
_v1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(h0, tf.transpose(W)) + vb) 
v1 = tf.nn.relu(tf.sign(_v1 - tf.random_uniform(tf.shape(_v1)))) #sample_v_given_h 
hTensor1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(v1, W) + hb) 
Samples from probabilistic tensor were selected as h0, which represents the input in the 
reconstruction phase. The same weight matrix and visible layer biases were used for the 
sigmoid function. The produced output was a reconstruction, which approximated the 
original input. 
Energy-based probabilistic models define a probability distribution as: 
 𝑝(𝑣) =
𝑒−𝐸(𝑣,ℎ)
𝑍
 where 𝑍 = ∑ 𝑒
−𝐸(𝑣,ℎ)
𝑣,ℎ   (23) 
 𝑝(𝑣) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑣, ℎ)ℎ =
𝑒−𝐸(𝑣,ℎ)
𝑍=∑ 𝑒
−𝐸(𝑣,ℎ)
𝑣,ℎ
 (24) 
An energy-based model can be learned by performing (stochastic) gradient descent on 
the empirical negative log-likelihood of the training data, where the log-likelihood and 
the loss function are: 
 𝐿(𝜃,  𝑉) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝(𝑣𝑖)𝑣𝑖𝜖𝑉      and     𝑙(𝜃, 𝑉) = −𝐿(𝜃,  𝑉) (25) 
Then the data negative log-likelihood gradient has the following form: 
 −
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
=
𝑑𝑃(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
− ∑ 𝑝(?̃?)?̃?
𝑑𝑃(?̃?)
𝑑𝜃
 (26) 
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 −
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
=
𝑑𝑃(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
−
1
|𝑁|
∑ 𝑝(?̃?)?̃?𝜖𝑁
𝑑𝑃(?̃?)
𝑑𝜃
  (27) 
where 𝑣′ is a sample of N. 
To minimise loss, we must maximise the product of probabilities assigned to the 
training set 
𝑑𝑃(𝑣)
𝑑𝜃
 
 𝑃(𝑣) = −𝑏′𝑣 − ∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∑ 𝑒ℎ𝑖(𝑐𝑖+𝑊𝑖𝑣)ℎ𝑖𝑖   (28) 
where 𝐸(𝑣, ℎ) = −𝑏′𝑣 − 𝑐′ℎ − ℎ′𝑊𝑣 and b’ and c are biases and hidden layers, 
respectively. 
From (27) and (28): 
 −
𝑑𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝(𝑣))
𝑑𝑊𝑖𝑗
= 𝐸𝑣[𝑝(ℎ𝑖|𝑣) ∙ 𝑣𝑗] − 𝑣𝑗
(𝑖) ∙ 𝜎(𝑊𝑖 ∙ 𝑣
(𝑖) + 𝑐𝑖) (29) 
Equation (29) defines the loss function as the average negative log-likelihood and the 
objective was to minimise it. To achieve this, we needed the partial derivative of this 
function with respect to its parameters. From Equation (29), optimisation or 
minimisation of loss depended on adjusting the weights (W) and biases (C). SGD was 
used to find the optimal W tensor. 
The derivation has two terms: the positive term 𝐸𝑣[𝑝(ℎ𝑖|𝑣) ∙ 𝑣𝑗], which depends on the 
data V, increases the probability of inputs. The second term is a negative term, −𝑣𝑗
(𝑖) ∙
𝜎(𝑊𝑖 ∙ 𝑣
(𝑖) + 𝑐𝑖) , which depends on the model and decreases the probability of the 
output generated by the model.  
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vb = tf.placeholder ("float", [41]) 
hb = tf.placeholder("float", [41]) 
W = tf.placeholder("float", [41,41]) 
v0 = tf.placeholder("float", [None, 41]) 
_h0 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(v0, W) + hb) #probabilities of the hidden units 
h0 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.sign(_h0 - tf.random_uniform(tf.shape(_h0))))  
_v1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(h0, tf.transpose(W)) + vb) 
v1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.sign(_v1 - tf.random_uniform(tf.shape(_v1))))  
h1 = tf.nn.sigmoid(tf.matmul(v1, W) + hb) 
alpha = 1.0 
w_pos_grad = tf.matmul(tf.transpose(v0), h0) 
w_neg_grad = tf.matmul(tf.transpose(v1), h1) 
CD = (w_pos_grad - w_neg_grad) / tf.to_float(tf.shape(v0)[0]) 
update_w = W + alpha * CD 
update_vb = vb + alpha * tf.reduce_mean(v0 - v1, 0) 
update_hb = hb + alpha * tf.reduce_mean(h0 - h1, 0) 
err = tf.reduce_mean(tf.square(v0 - v1)) 
cur_w = np.zeros([41, 41], np.float32) 
cur_vb = np.zeros([41], np.float32) 
cur_hb = np.zeros([41], np.float32) 
prv_w = np.zeros([41, 41], np.float32) 
prv_vb = np.zeros([41], np.float32) 
prv_hb = np.zeros([41], np.float32) 
sess = tf.Session() 
init = tf.global_variables_initializer() 
sess.run(init) 
idsys = sess.run(err, feed_dict={v0: Xtrain, W: prv_w, vb: prv_vb, hb: prv_hb}) 
print (idsys) 
epochs = 10 
batchsize = 300 
weights = [] 
errors = [] 
rbf_feature = Nystroem(kernel=‘rbf’, gamma=1, n_components=41, random_state=1) 
k = rbf_feature.fit_transform(Xtrain) 
#k=Xtrain 
for epoch in range(epochs): 
 print (epoch) 
 for start, end in zip( range(0, 400000, batchsize), range(batchsize, 400000, batchsize)): 
  batch = k[start:end] 
  print (start) 
  cur_w = sess.run(update_w, feed_dict={v0: batch, W: prv_w, vb: prv_vb, hb: prv_hb}) 
  cur_vb = sess.run(update_vb, feed_dict={ v0: batch, W: prv_w, vb: prv_vb, hb: prv_hb}) 
  cur_hb = sess.run(update_hb, feed_dict={ v0: batch, W: prv_w, vb: prv_vb, hb: prv_hb}) 
  prv_w = cur_w 
  prv_vb = cur_vb 
  prv_hb = cur_hb 
  print (cur_w 
  errors.append(sess.run(err, feed_dict={v0: k, W: cur_w, vb: cur_vb, hb: cur_hb})) 
  weights.append(cur_w) 
  print (errors[-1])p 
 print (‘Epoch: %d’ % epoch,’reconstruction error: %f’ % errors[-1]) 
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The positive phase increased the probability of training data. The negative phase 
decreased the probability of samples generated by the model. 
Given that the negative phase was difficult to compute, the CD was used to approximate 
it. It was designed in such a way that the direction of the gradient estimate was at least 
somewhat accurate, even when the size was not (in real-world models, more accurate 
techniques such as CD-k or PCD are used to train RBMs). During the calculation of 
CD, we used Gibbs sampling to sample from our model distribution. 
CD is a matrix of values that were computed and used to adjust the values of the W 
matrix. Changing W led to the training of W values. Subsequently, for each step 
(epoch), W was updated to a new value (W’) using the equation below: 
 W’ = W+alpha∗ (30) 
where alpha is the learning rate that adjusts the model to respond to the cost. 
To compute the CD, a training sample from X was selected to calculate the probabilities 
of the hidden units and sample a hidden activation vector (h0) from this probability 
distribution. 
 _h0=sigmoid(X⊗W+hb)_h0 
 h0=sampleProb(h0) 
1. calculate the outer product of X and h0 and call this the positive gradient 
2. w_pos_grad = X⊗h0w_pos_grad = X⊗h0 (reconstruction in the first pass) 
3. From h, reconstruct v1, take a sample of the visible units, then resample the 
hidden activations h1 from this (Gibbs sampling step) 
4. _v1 = sigmoid(h0⊗transpose(W)+vb) 
5. v1 = sampleprob(v1) (Sample v given h) 
6. h1 = sigmoid(v1⊗W+hb) 
7. calculate the outer product of v1 and h1 and call this the negative gradient 
8. w_neg_grad = v1⊗ (reconstruction 1) 
9. Now, CD equals the positive gradient minus the negative gradient 
10. CD = (w_pos_grad−w_neg_grad)/ 
11. Update the weight to be CD times some learning rate 
12. W’ = W+alpha∗CD 
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13. At the end of the algorithm, the visible nodes will store the value of the sample. 
Then, the tensor of probabilities was selected (from a sigmoidal activation) and samples 
were made from all distributions (h0). Hence, the sampling for the activation vector 
from the probability distribution of hidden layer values was computed. Samples were 
used to estimate the negative phase gradient. 
The second phase implements the K-means and mean shift algorithms, to cluster the 
reconstruction errors produced by the RBM model as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
npar= np.array(rcerrs) 
km = KMeans(n_clusters=8) 
cl= km.fit(npar.reshape(-1,1)) 
print(cl.labels_) 
print (type(cl.labels_)) 
kcls= [(x,y) for x , y in  zip (tst  , cl.labels_ )] 
 
gcl = list(set(cl.labels_)) 
 
print(gcl) 
groups = []  
for c in gcl: 
    clx=   [i for i,x in enumerate(cl.labels_) if x == c] 
    groups.append(clx) 
     
kclusters = [] 
for i in groups: 
 
    cla = [list(tst[x]) for x in i ] 
    kclusters.append(cla) 
 
for i in kclusters: 
    nrm = 0 
    abnr=0 
    for x in i :      
        if (x[0]== 1.0) and (x[1]== 0.0): 
 
            nrm= nrm + 1 
                 
        else: 
            abnr = abnr + 1 
    print(" KCluster normal") 
    print(nrm) 
    print(" KCluster abnormal") 
    print(abnr) 
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
X = np.array(list(zip(rcerrs,np.zeros(len(rcerrs))))) 
bandwidth = estimate_bandwidth(X, quantile=0.2) 
ms = MeanShift(bandwidth=bandwidth, bin_seeding=True) 
 120 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the implementation of the proposed framework. The 
implementation was conducted for four scenarios.  Four algorithms were implemented 
autoencoder, RBM, k-means, mean shift. Then these algorithms were integrated 
together, where the first phase is either autoencoder or an RBM, then the second phase 
is k-means or mean shift. These four scenarios were implemented to ensure the 
inclusiveness of results. Tensorflow deep learning framework from Google and Scikit 
Python library were during the development. KDD99 dataset is used during the 
execution of training and testing steps. In the next chapter, the results are collected, 
analysed and evaluated. 
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Chapter 6: Results, Analysis and Evaluation 
DL has been used in several anomaly detection applications, including network 
anomalies. The framework was trained using a networking traffic dataset before 
samples of different sizes were passed through the system for testing. Statistical results 
were presented using a confusion matrix to measure several aspects of the framework, 
including accuracy and precision. This chapter provides a comparative analysis of 
results. 
To demonstrate the contribution of this thesis, an in-depth analysis of the results is 
presented. The confusion matrix is a standard statistical tool used to evaluate the 
performance of machine learning predictors. It was used in this analysis to compare the 
performance of the framework with similar approaches used by other researchers. An 
essential component of the analysis was to demonstrate correlations between the 
theoretical design principles discussed in Chapter 4 and the results summarised in this 
chapter. 
The first section introduces the analysis goals and methods. The second section 
demonstrates the system in the execution (e.g. training and testing outputs for various 
implementation scenarios discussed in the previous chapter). Additionally, the results 
collected during various stages of execution are collected and organised. The third 
section discusses design principles and how they affected implementation. The fourth 
section provides a detailed analysis of the results. The fifth section presents an 
evaluation of the framework results compared with other similar proposed frameworks. 
6.1 Introduction 
DL-based anomaly detection has been explored in several papers on network anomaly 
detection. A typical approach adopted by researchers is to use unsupervised DL as a 
pre-processing step to finding patterns in the data before forwarding the output layer 
from the neural network to a second classification or clustering algorithm. The proposed 
framework presented in this thesis adopted a similar approach but had different goals, a 
unique technical implementation and better accuracy and precision metrics. The primary 
purpose for using DL was to reduce the dimensionality of input data, making the second 
phase (clustering/classification) more straightforward in terms of computation resources 
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and time and providing higher accuracy in clustering. In its implementation, the 
framework simplified the output from the first phase/input to a single value for each 
network traffic record in the second phase, unlike similar approaches, which have used 
the output from the DL algorithm or, in some cases, hidden layers. Additionally, during 
the implementation, the problem of highly correlated data was managed by increasing 
the features of the first hidden layers, then reducing them in the subsequent layers. 
The implementation described in the previous chapter is examined by using several 
samples of different sizes. Different results were collected during successive execution 
steps; the output was recorded, then analysed using the confusion matrix. A confusion 
matrix provided a set of measurement tools such as accuracy, precision and an F1 score. 
The statistical measurements were applied to data collected in different scenarios 
described in the previous chapter. There were two primary goals for the analysis 
process. The first was to compare the performance of the autoencoder and the RBM in 
network anomaly detection to confirm and validate results, with two different 
algorithms used in the second phase. Second, analysis statistics were used to compare 
the framework performance against other related works. 
6.2 Results 
Epoch: 0001 cost= 0.027297018 
Epoch: 0002 cost= 0.027274711 
Epoch: 0003 cost= 0.027273355 
Epoch: 0004 cost= 0.027272990 
Epoch: 0005 cost= 0.027274150 
Epoch: 0006 cost= 0.027274083 
Epoch: 0007 cost= 0.027274333 
Epoch: 0008 cost= 0.027273895 
Epoch: 0009 cost= 0.027274128 
Epoch: 0010 cost= 0.030739360 
Epoch: 0011 cost= 0.015888004 
Epoch: 0012 cost= 0.012710391 
Epoch: 0013 cost= 0.027804116 
Epoch: 0014 cost= 0.027811782 
Epoch: 0015 cost= 0.027810751 
Epoch: 0016 cost= 0.027810829 
Epoch: 0017 cost= 0.027407454 
Epoch: 0018 cost= 0.027407652 
Epoch: 0019 cost= 0.027407601 
Epoch: 0020 cost= 0.027407428 
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This section provides the results at various stages of the simulation. During the training 
phase, the decrease in reconstruction error produced by using optimisers indicated 
algorithm convergence. Convergence can be shown on two levels, the epoch and the 
batches. The results provided below are samples of the cost over 20 sweeps of the 
training samples. Notably, the cost decreased smoothly from the first epoch to the last. 
Figure 6.1 shows the performance of two different optimisers: SGD and Adam. 
 
Figure 6.1. Optimisation using stochastic gradient descent and Adam optimiser. 
Because the model was constructed using required weights and biases and put through 
several iterations to optimise the cost of previous diagrams and to confirm the values, 
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the next step was to subject the system to a testing phase. A sequence of traffic records, 
shown below, were loaded into the model. 
|labels 1 0 |features 0.0 0.0 0.33 0.77 0.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.03 
|labels 1 0 |features 0.0 0.0 0.33 0.77 0.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
0.0 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01 
|labels 0 1 |features 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.65 0.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
0.0 0.94 0.94 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
|labels 0 1 |features 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.65 0.85 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 
0.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
As discussed in the implementation chapter, the testing data contained normal and 
abnormal traffic packets for which the records were normalised. Labels were not used 
by the system during the clustering; rather, they were used to validate and evaluate the 
accuracy achieved. The model provides a single value representing the reconstruction 
error for each of the testing records, as shown below. 
[0.087900057, 0.12927638, 0.0034244901, 0.00090605248, 0.092122331, 0.011742176, 0.12852195, 
0.067880958, 0.15653908, 0.09629482, 0.077442065, 0.08034879, 0.002997661, 0.099123523, 
0.13377792, 0.0036739921, 0.077225119, 0.0017729657, 0.0021743756, 0.00093818858, 0.082389377, 
0.0020744232, 0.082912229, 0.14693747, 0.076985508, 0.10832905, 0.13633011, 0.075034223, 
0.097027674, 0.010716964, 0.082746595, 0.09506125, 0.077529229, 0.091491975, 0.077032238, 
0.1488664, 0.14351323, 0.07653933, 0.084063888, 0.15645327, 0.095991701, 0.093754239, 
0.095752604, 0.094319329, 0.14569174, 0.00071955862, 0.082940266, 0.091592737, 0.076763138, 
0.081645504, 0.075114369, 0.071573846 
In the testing phase, both the autoencoder and the RBM produced a list of 
reconstruction errors. Figure 6.2 illustrates the visual distribution pattern of 
reconstruction errors. The proposed system considered the clustering of these 
reconstruction errors. Hence, anomalies converged in the same clusters. Of note in the 
previous distribution is that values were not linearly separable. Hence, a simple 
regression algorithm was not applicable. 
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Figure 6.2. Reconstruction error distributions for autoencoder and restricted 
Boltamann machine. 
Additionally, given the nonlinearity of the distribution, defining a threshold for definite 
abnormality was not practically feasible. Hence, the next phase of the detection system 
was to find patterns automatically in the distribution using the unsupervised approach. 
The algorithm in the second phase was simple because the required task involved 
clustering for single value inputs. 
k-means algorithms take a vector of reconstruction errors as the input and produce a set 
of clusters, with each cluster consisting of a set of reconstruction errors. Each value 
indicates a record that is normal or abnormal. For example, the bar chart in Figure 6.3 
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below illustrates the identified clusters, with each bar representing a single cluster. In a 
perfect situation, a cluster will contain either normal or abnormal samples; however, 
given the relatively small accuracy error—to be discussed in the analysis and evaluation 
sections—some clusters may contain both but have dominance for one type, marking 
them as either normal or abnormal. In the tables and diagrams below, the mean shift 
appears to provide better accuracy; however, in the full analysis, k-means was superior. 
Table 6.1. k-Means Cluster Contents 
 Normal Abnormal 
C1 139 3 
C2 4 183 
C3 0 302 
C4 172 0 
C5 0 150 
C6 100 2 
C7 0 61 
C8 184 0 
 
Figure 6.3. k-means graphical representation for clusters. 
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Table 6.2. Mean Shift Clusters 
 Normal Abnormal 
C1 584 1 
C2 0 324 
C3 15 335 
C4 0 38 
C5 0 3 
 
Figure 6.4. Graphical representation of mean shift clusters 
Figure 6.5 shows the distribution of clusters produced by k-means. The vertical axis 
represents reconstruction errors, while the horizontal axis represents clusters. The 
distribution demonstrates the nonlinearity of samples where the applicability of 
thresholds or regression tasks was not applicable. 
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Figure 6.5. k-means cluster distribution. 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 summarise the results collected for the autoencoder and RBM with 
the integration of k-means and mean shift for different sample sizes of 1.3 k and 
800,400 records. For k-means, experimental trials were used to decide on cluster 
numbers with fewer sampling errors. In contrast, the mean shift did not require a pre-
determined number of clusters. Hence, the number of clusters varied for each algorithm 
and there was more focus on the performance of the algorithm. Additionally, the 
samples were selected randomly from the KDD99 testing dataset.
  
1
2
9
 
Table 6.3. Autoencoder Simulation Scenario Results Summary 
 
 
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 
AE 1,300 k-means 
Normal 139 4 0 172 0 100 0 184 
Abnormal 3 183 302 0 150 2 61 0 
AE 1,300 mean shift 
Normal 584 0 15 0 0    
Abnormal 1 324 335 38 3    
AE 800 k-means 
Normal 54 0 0 112 87 0 127 0 
Abnormal 1 193 92 0 0 89 0 47 
AE 800 mean shift 
Normal 0 378 2      
Abnormal 298 1 121      
AE 400 k-means 
Normal 0 59 0 28 55 0 0 54 
Abnormal 47 0 72 0 0 43 42 0 
AE 400 mean shift 
Normal 192 0 4      
Abnormal 0 114 90      
  
1
3
0
 
Table 6.4. Restricted Boltzmann Machine Simulation Scenario Results Summary 
  Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 Cluster 6 Cluster 7 Cluster 8 
RBM 1,300 k-means 
Normal 1 27 261 1 1 0 82 130 
Abnormal 413 154 0 0 0 230 0 0 
RBM 1,300 mean shift 
Normal 0 26 253 115 80 26 1 2 
Abnormal 413 384 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RBM 800 k-means 
Normal 0 14 1 87 1 159 52 0 
Abnormal 253 120 0 0 0 0 0 113 
RBM 800 mean shift 
Normal 0 14 154 92 52 1 1 
 Abnormal 253 233 0 0 0 0 0 
 
RBM 400 k-means 
Normal 0 92 25 10 6 0 29 7 
Abnormal 62 0 0 0 119 50 0 0 
RBM 400 mean shift 
Normal 0 4 87 41 25 4 8 
 Abnormal 119 111 0 0 1 0 0 
 Note. RBM: Restricted Boltzmann machine 
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6.3 Analysis 
The confusion matrix is a standard statistical tool to measure the performance of 
machine learning classifiers. To apply the confusion matrix as an evaluation tool, the 
clustering process is considered a classifier with no prior knowledge about available 
classes; however, the overall goal of clustering is to classify similar samples together. 
Hence, the difference between the classifier and the clustering algorithms lies in the 
starting point in which supervised classifiers have prior knowledge of classes. However, 
in essence, both classify samples to a specific group (i.e. a cluster or class). Therefore, 
the framework performed the clustering and normal or abnormal labels arising from the 
dataset were used in conjunction with the confusion matrix for the analysis. The 
confusion matrix shows the measurements illustrated in Table 6.5 below. 
Table 6.5. Confusion Matrix Statistics 
Sensitivity (recall) 
True positive rate (TPR) 
TPR = TP/(TP+FN) 
Specificity 
Specificity (SPC) or true negative rate (TNR) 
SPC = TN/(FP+TN) 
Precision 
Precision or positive predictive value (PPV) 
PPV = TP/(TP+FP) 
Negative predictive value 
Negative predictive value (NPV) 
NPV = TN/(TN+FN) 
False-positive rate 
Fall-out or false-positive rate (FPR) 
FPR = FP/(FP+TN) 
False-discovery rate 
False discovery rate (FDR) 
FDR = FP/(FP+TP) 
False-negative rate 
Miss rate or false-negative rate (FNR) 
FNR = FN/(FN+TP) 
Accuracy 
Accuracy (ACC) 
ACC = (TP+TN)/(P+N) 
F1 score 
F1 score (F1) 
F1 = 2TP/(2TP+FP+FN) 
Note: True positive (TP): correctly predicts a normal label as normal; true negative (TN): correctly 
predicts an abnormal label as abnormal; false positive (FP): incorrectly predicts an abnormal label as 
normal; false negative (FN): incorrectly predicts a normal label as abnormal; precision or positive 
predictive values (PPV): the proportion of predicted positive cases that were correct; accuracy (ACC): the 
proportion of total number of correct predictions; F1 score: considers the balance between precision and 
sensitivity or recall (i.e. the weighted average of sensitivity and precision). 
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The analysis process considered various metrics so that comparative studies would be 
comprehensive. 
The framework predicted three different samples of different sizes (400, 800 and 1,300). 
Table 6.6 presents the statistical results for the autoencoder and RBM used in 
conjunction with k-means. Accuracy represents how often the framework was correct. 
The highest accuracy was achieved by the autoencoder using the lowest number of 
samples (400). Unexpectedly, accuracy declined as the number of samples increased. 
Additionally, the autoencoder achieved the best accuracy in conjunction with the mean 
shift algorithm (presented in Table 6.7). The F1 score represents precision (true positive 
results/total true positives by the framework) and recall (number of true positive results 
in the total sample). The autoencoder resulted in the highest F1 values, shown in Tables 
6.6 and 6.7. 
Table 6.6. Confusion Matrix for Autoencoder and Restricted Boltzmann Machine + k-
Means 
 1,300 k-means 800 k-means 400 k-means 
 AE RBM AE RBM AE RBM 
Sensitivity 0.9917 1 0.9974 1 1 1 
Specificity 0.9943 0.9661 1 0.972 1 0.9747 
Precision 0.9933 0.9443 1 0.9554 1 0.9645 
NPV 0.9929 1 0.9976 1 1 1 
FPR 0.0057 0.0339 0 0.028 0 0.0253 
FDR 0.0067 0.0557 0 0.0446 0 0.0355 
FNR 0.0083 0 0.0026 0 0 0 
Accuracy 0.9931 0.9785 0.9988 0.9825 1 0.985 
F1 score 0.9925 0.9714 0.9987 0.9772 1 0.9819 
Note. AE: autoencoder; RBM: restricted Boltzmann machine; NPV: negative predictive value; FPR: 
false-positive rate; FDR: false-discovery rate; FNR: false-negative rate. 
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Table 6.7. Confusion Matrix for Autoencoder and Restricted Boltzmann Machine 
+Mean Shift 
 1,300 mean shifts 800 mean shifts 400 mean shifts 
 AE RBM AE RBM AE RBM 
Sensitivity 0.9932 1 0.9974 1 1 1 
Specificity 0.9789 0.9684 0.9952 0.972 0.9808 0.7241 
Precision 0.975 0.9483 0.9947 0.9466 0.9796 0.4793 
NPV 0.9943 1 0.9976 1 1 1 
FPR 0.0211 0.0316 0.0048 0.028 0.0192 0.2759 
FDR 0.025 0.0517 0.0053 0.0534 0.0204 0.5207 
FNR 0.0068 0 0.0026 0 0 0 
Accuracy 0.9854 0.98 0.9963 0.9813 0.99 0.78 
F1 score 0.984 0.9735 0.996 0.9725 0.9897 0.648 
Note. NPV: Negative predictive value; FPR: false-positive rate; FDR: false-discovery rate; FNR: false-
negative rate. 
To summarise the performance of the framework, the confusion matrix consists of 
columns and rows that list the number of testing samples as either predicted or actual 
ratios. Figure 6.6 provides a general description of the confusion matrix, which has two 
classes—normal and abnormal. The second phase was conducted to validate results 
using two different clustering algorithms: k-means and mean shift. The confusion 
matrices for both for different samples sizes are shown in Figures 6.7 to 6.18 below. 
 
Figure 6.6. Confusion matrix graphical table. 
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Figure 6.7. Autoencoder and k-means 
(400 samples) 
Figure 6.8. Autoencoder and k-means 
(800 samples) 
Figure 6.9. Autoencoder and k-means 
(1300 samples) 
Figure 6.10. Autoencoder and mean shift (400 
samples) 
Figure 6.11. Autoencoder and mean shift 
(800 samples) 
Figure 6.12. Autoencoder and mean shift (1300 
samples) 
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Figure 6.13. Restricted Boltzmann machine 
and k-means (400 samples) 
Figure 6.14. Restricted Boltzmann 
machine and k-means (800 samples) 
Figure 6.15. Restricted Boltzmann machine 
and k-means (1300 samples) 
Figure 6.16. Restricted Boltzmann machine 
and mean shift (400 samples) 
Figure 6.17. Restricted Boltzmann machine 
and mean shift (800 samples) 
Figure 6.18. Restricted Boltzmann machine 
and mean shift (1300 samples) 
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6.4 Design Principles in Action 
In section 4, six principles were proposed for the framework design. In Chapters 5 and 
6, principles were translated to implementation and results, respectively. This section 
provides a discussion of the principles according to the output results analysis. 
 
Figure 6.19 Reconstruction errors used for forming clusters. 
Figure 6.19  depicts the framework components and the use of reconstruction errors in 
the clustering at the second phase. One of the main principles of the framework is 
dimensionality reduction, which was used to find patterns in the data. In the past, 
datasets have been subject to redundancy issues attributable to repetition of records, 
which is a component of DoS attacks. Additionally, the number of the features was not 
sufficiently complex for DL algorithms—this problem was not only limited to the 
selected dataset, but also to the limited number of the fields in the IP/TCP packet (or 
OverFlow header). For example, in image recognition applications, the number of 
features is represented by the number of pixels in the image—for a simple image with 
600*800, the number of input features will be extremely large compared with 41 
features in an IP/TCP packet. Additionally, the dataset or network traffic records 
generally only vary in a small number of fields; for example, in the records shown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 RE1 RE2 RE3 
41 5 
41 82 82 
Traffic Record 1 
Traffic Record 2 
Traffic Record 3 
K-means 
Normal 
    Abnormal 
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below, only 25% of the record fields changed, but many of them were repeated in other 
records. This problem translates as a high correlation between data records. 
|features 0.0 0.3333 0.6056 0.8451 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
0.002 0.002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1608 0.4118 0.44 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 
|features 0.0002 0.3333 0.6056 0.8451 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
0.002 0.002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1647 0.4118 0.45 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 
|features 0.0001 0.3333 0.6056 0.8451 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
0.002 0.002 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.1686 0.4157 0.47 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 
|features 0.0 0.3333 0.6056 0.8451 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 
0.002 0.0059 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.1725 0.4157 0.48 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 
The code provided below takes two records as the input list and uses the corrcoef() 
function to calculate a matrix of correlations of record 1 with record 1, record 1 with 
record 2, record 2 with record 1 and record 2 with record 2. The correlation between the 
two records was 0.99998215, which is very high. These problems translate as poor 
generalisation for the model. 
import numpy as np 
record 1 = [0.0, 0.3333, 0.6056, 0.8451, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 
0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.002, 0.002, 0.0 ,0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.1608, 0.4118, 0.44, 0.1, 0.02, 0.02, 0.0 ,0.0 ,0.0] 
record2 = [0.0002,0.3333,0.6056,0.8451,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0,0.0,0.
0,0.002,0.002,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,1.0,0.0,0.0,0.1647,0.4118,0.45,0.1,0.02,0.02,0.0,0.0,0.0] 
correlation = np.corrcoef(record1,record2) 
print(correlation) 
[[1.0.99998215] 
[0.99998215 1]] 
To solve this problem, an approach similar to that of kernel PCA was adopted. In kernel 
PCA, data are projected onto higher dimensions before dimensionality reduction is 
applied. Projecting the data onto high dimensions makes it more separable. Figure 6.20 
demonstrates the concept of increasing the dimensionality of the input data (41) to 82 
features in the first hidden layer, subsequently reducing the dimensions to five. The 
experimental results show the efficiency of the approach. The figure below depicts a 
confusion matrix of the results of traditional dimensionality reduction in which the input 
was 41, the first hidden layers included 22 features, followed by five neurons layer. The 
accuracy in this model was .90, which is lower than the accuracy of > .99 achieved by 
the proposed solution.  
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Figure 6.20. System accuracy without increasing neurons in the first hidden layer. 
Figure 6.21 shows the correlation propagated to the cluster distribution in which the 
clusters are tightly distributed over the reconstruction errors, with spikes for some 
clusters (which are slightly different from the other clusters). These strong relationships 
complicate the separation on two levels: samples and clusters. 
 
Figure 6.21. Reconstruction error distribution without increasing dimensionality in the 
first layer. 
Sensitivity 0.9974 
Specificity 0.8647 
Precision 0.7575 
Negative predictive value 0.9987 
False-positive rate 0.1353 
False-discovery rate 0.2425 
False-negative rate 0.0026 
Accuracy 0.9042 
F1 Score 0.861 
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6.5 Evaluations 
To highlight the contributions of this research, a comparative study with similar and 
related work was done. For the selected work, which was closely related to this 
research, an in-depth study of these approaches, experiment and results were conducted. 
These factors were discussed in the previous section in which a comprehensive 
comparative study was presented to evaluate and emphasise the intersection and 
distinction of this work. 
Table 6.8. Related Work Performance 
 Algorithms Dataset Performance Statistics 
 [139] Discriminative 
RBM 
KDD99 Accuracy ≈ 84% 
 [149] Autoencoder + 
classifier 
KDD99 Accuracy = 97.85% 
Precision = 99.99% 
Recall = 97.85% 
F-score = 98.15% 
False alarm = 2.15% 
 [140] Sparse 
autoencoder 
NSL-KDD Accuracy ≈ 98% 
F-score ≈ 98.84% 
 [150] SVM and k-
means 
KDD99 Accuracy up to 90% 
[142] Autoencoder Different 
dataset 
Accuracy 70–93% 
 [151] k-means KDD99 Accuracy 85–95% for different 
samples 
Unlike the generative RBMs used in this research, the authors in [139] used a 
discriminative RBM as the unsupervised pre-step. In their work, RBMs were deployed 
as discriminative classifiers or as a standalone supervised classifier, which adds classes 
to the input records at the training phase. 
In RBM, the p (v,h) formula is: 
 
 (31) 
where v and h are visible and hidden units, respectively. 
Discriminative RBMs consider the output at the input for the probability distribution: 
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  𝑝(𝑣, ℎ, 𝑦)𝛼 exp (−𝐸(𝑣, ℎ, 𝑦)) (32) 
where y is the output and E is the energy function. 
The goal of the classifier is to optimise p(y/v) instead of p(y,v) in RBM. 
During the implementation, the authors adopted a semi-supervised approach in which 
the discriminative RBM was trained on normal records only. The KDD99 dataset was 
used for training and only around 97 k instances were used. Additionally, from 41 
features, 28 were selected. In their results for accuracy, the algorithm showed 84% on 
KDD testing data. As one of the proposed scenarios in this thesis, RBM was deployed 
as a pre-training phase for k-means and mean shift. The RBM worked as pre-training 
feature extractor rather than a single classifier. Similar to discriminative RBM, KDD99 
was used. However, all 41 features were selected, and the system was trained using 
800 k instances of the training data. RBM with k-means had an accuracy of over 98%, 
which represents a significant improvement over the proposed approach in. 
In this paper, the authors proposed an anomaly detection framework based on a 
variation of the autoencoder known as a non-symmetric deep autoencoder (NDAE) 
[149]. Figure 6.22 depicts the framework architecture. The framework was composed of 
two phases: an NDAE was used for the first phase and a random forest classifier was 
used for the second phase. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.22. Using the encoder from deep autoencoders with a classifier. 
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Figure 6.23 shows the difference between a typical autoencoder and an NDAE, which, 
unlike the autoencoder, does not include a decoder. At the first layer, a stacked NDAE 
was used to encode the input vector, which was then forwarded to the classifier. A stack 
of NDAEs was used to increase the depth (i.e., to discover more features) and reduce 
the computation complexity of increasing hidden layers. 
 
Figure 6.23. Autoencoders vs. non-symmetric deep autoencoders. 
This thesis proposed a similar approach with respect to using two phases, an 
autoencoder and a simple algorithm—k-means or mean shift. Additionally, this 
approach adopted dimensionality reduction to simplify classification during the second 
phase. However, the design considered in this thesis utilised a single autoencoder that 
included an encoder and the decoder for the output layers. In contrast to the 
abovementioned work, the proposed framework reduced dimensions to a single value 
for reconstruction errors. 
The authors used the KDD99 dataset for their simulation, using 125 k sample records in 
the training phase. Results were analysed using a confusion matrix and contrasted with 
another DL algorithm, a deep belief network. 
Table 6.9 compares results from NDAE, deep belief network and autoencoder using k-
means (1.3 k samples). The analysis shows a significant improvement of ≈ 15% in 
accuracy and recall and a similar decrease in the false alarm rate of ≈ 15%. NDAE 
resulted in slightly better precision. F-score, which represents recall and precision, was 
superior in the proposed framework. The algorithm used in the second phase involved a 
random forest classifier, which is in supervised mode; however, the system lacks the 
essential feature of zero-day attack classification. The work proposed in this thesis used 
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two unsupervised algorithms, which, as discussed in Chapter 4, increases the probability 
of detecting new attacks. 
Table 6.9. Performance of NDAE vs. DBN and proposed system in this research. 
 Accuracy Precision Recall F-Score False alarm rate 
NDAE 85.42 100.00 85.42 87.37 14.58 
DBN 80.58 88.10 80.58 84.08 19.42 
Autoencoder + k-means 0.9931 0.9933 0.9917 0.9925 0.0067 
Note: NDAE: non-symmetric autoencoder; DBN: deep belief network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.24. Using the encoder output for classification. 
In [140] sparse autoencoders were used in the first layer as a feature extractor; 
subsequently, the learned features from the encoder were forwarded to a classifier. 
Sparsity improves the generalisation of the algorithm in which a constraint is imposed 
on the activation function of each neuron (j) to be close enough to sparsity (𝜌) as in the 
formula below: 
 ?̂?𝑗 =
1
𝑚
∑ [𝑎𝑗
(Bn)(𝑥(𝑖))]
𝑚
𝑖=1
 (33) 
where 𝑎𝑗
(Bn)
 is activation of the 𝑗th neuron of the autoencoder, and 𝑎𝑗
(Bn)(𝑥) is neuron 
activation linked to the input. 
The learned features of the sparse autoencoder were classified using a softmax 
regression layer, as shown in figure 6.25 [140], which is an extension of classical 
Classifier 
C2 
 
C1 
 
Decoded samples 
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logistic regression for multiclass classification. The authors benchmarked a revised 
version of KDD99 dataset—NSL-KDD—by removing redundant records. 
A confusion matrix was used for the analysis of the study, showing an accuracy of 
≈ 98%. Similar to other approaches discussed, this framework used the entire extracted 
features from the first phase as input to the second phase. 
 
Figure 6.25. The proposed classification system based on sparse autoencoder [143]. 
Autoencoders have been used for anomaly detection based on dimensionality reduction. 
However, accuracy has been relatively weak compared with traditional PCA and its 
variation achieved a significant improvement in some of the datasets [142]. However, as 
proposed in this thesis, adding an extra simple algorithm to cluster the pre- processed 
data significantly improved accuracy. 
Another approach used k-means clustering in the pre-processing step, with results then 
being fed to an SVM classifier. However, the performance was poor, with 90% 
accuracy [150]. Another work focused on improving the k-means for intrusion detection 
in KDD99, showing unstable results ranging between 85% and 95% [151], compared 
with the proposed framework, in which accuracy is more stable and noticeably 
improved. 
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Compared with all previously mentioned related works, the proposed framework 
(autoencoder + k-means) in this thesis outperformed with respect to accuracy. The 
frameworks in [149] and [140] used a similar approach; however, technically, the 
proposed framework in this research improves dimensionality reduction, while others 
have forwarded the learned features from the DL approach. Additionally, the 
comparative study shows the superiority of the adopted approach. Dimensionality 
reduction in this work did not involve a complicated second phase, negating the need 
for an expensive computation algorithm and improving the performance of available 
resources. 
6.6 Summary 
This chapter presented the execution results for several samples of different sizes. An 
output was depicted for every single step execution for the different scenarios discussed 
in the simulation chapter. The outputs showed the convergence of the framework (for 
the autoencoder and RBM) in which cost optimisation was downgraded during epoch 
sweeps. The results, which included samples of the identified reconstruction errors and 
their distributions graphs, supported verification of the model in the testing phase. 
Further, the clustering results for different scenarios were presented. Each cluster was 
shown in two components (normal and abnormal samples), and results verified the 
labels associated with the original dataset after clustering. 
This chapter presented an analysis of results that evaluated the various combinations 
using DL algorithms and clustering algorithms. Given that related works have used the 
same approach, a confusion matrix was selected for the analysis process, facilitating 
comparison and evaluation. Accuracy and other related measures showed that 
autoencoder and k-means outperformed other scenarios. 
Additionally, this chapter offered a solution to the problem of highly correlated data and 
the limited number of features in network traffic packets. The solution was adopted 
from the kernel trick in PCA algorithms in which the original data were projected into a 
new dimension where they became separable, followed by an application for 
dimensionality reduction in subsequent layers. In a comparison of results for direct 
dimensionality reduction and the application of projecting the data in new dimensions, 
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the analysis showed that the first approach achieved 90% accuracy, where the second 
approach scored more than 99%. 
To highlight the thesis contributions, a comparative analysis was conducted against 
related works. At the implementation level, similar research has adopted DL as a pre-
training step before forwarding outputs (decoded hidden layers) to a classifier in the 
second phase. Technically, the adopted approach in this thesis differed in that the DL 
phase was used as a dimensionality reduction approach, which reduced the output to a 
single value for each record. From the results, the framework outperformed all similar 
frameworks with regard to accuracy and precision.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
SDN architecture provides flexibility and programmability by separating the controller 
from the data planes. While this offers many advantages, the risk of attacks on the 
flexible control plane makes SDN highly vulnerable to serious security breaches. The 
impacts of such attacks are intensified as a direct consequence of the increased agility 
and flexibility of SDN that arises from consolidating the control planes of multiple 
networking devices into a single central controller. 
SDN has introduced a novel networking paradigm. SDN architecture separates the data 
planes from the control plane, which generates the flow rules required for data plane 
devices to forward packets. Logic is detached from devices to form a new plane known 
as the controller. The SDN model simplifies the traditional network and leverages the 
management of flexibility and scalability. 
SDN had been used in various applications, including in network traffic engineering, 
network monitoring and virtualisation. The centralisation and providing a global view 
of the entire network provide better network statistics, which support decisions in 
network traffic balance and network monitoring. The concept of device abstraction 
(separation of device logic into the controller) intersects with virtualisation in which 
devices are abstracted and shared. Additionally, SDN has been a driver of several 
networking environments, including IoT, cloud computing and wireless networks. The 
complexity of these environments increases the complexity of network management in 
which SDN boosts networking resilience and abstraction. For example, in infrastructure 
as a service cloud computing, tenants share physical computing and networking devices, 
while resource sharing is executed through the device virtualisation and abstraction 
adopted by SDN. 
SDN is also utilised to improve security. The new model provides several applications 
for security purposes, including security policy enforcement and verification and threat 
detection systems. Programmability and a global network view enable the development 
of improved capabilities and abstraction improves the efficiency of hardware. 
Nevertheless, security is a significant challenge in SDN networks. Given that a single 
entity governs the entire network, the controller is a crucial element in the SDN model. 
 147 
A centralised configuration is highly vulnerable because the controller is an attractive 
target for intruders. The severity of the traditional attacks is higher in SDN networks. 
Additionally, SDN has an extended attack vector because of the introduction of the 
controller. 
This thesis investigated current security solutions and their limitations. The study 
provided an empirical analysis of SDN controller security to identify, formalise and 
quantify security concerns related to the new model. This study explored the threats 
related to SDN architecture, specifically those originating from the existence of the 
control plane. Controller security was analysed in three stages. The first stage defined 
potential threats based on a review of the literature. In the second stage, threats were 
demonstrated and modelled using a STRIDE analysis and an in-depth attack-oriented 
analysis was conducted using several attack trees. The third stage introduced an 
experiment to simulate threats and identify consequences. 
The study provides a comprehensive understanding of the problem domain by 
identifying the security flaws of SDN. Prior analysis has shown that the controller is the 
major weak point in the architecture and is vulnerable to traditional network attacks 
such as man-in-the-middle attacks, spoofing and DoS, which primarily arise from two 
factors. First, the controller is an entity with more advanced capabilities than those of 
classic NOS such as Cisco IOS. These capabilities arise from the more complex 
software, which is prone to more significant vulnerabilities. Second, as a centralised 
entity with governance over the entire network and the facilitator of communications 
between the applications and forwarding planes, the controller may be a single cause of 
failure. 
A typical networking security measure is the use of IDS, which primarily aim to 
identify network threats. Several approaches have been adopted, including signature-
based and anomaly-based detection methods. Signature-based detection approaches 
utilise databases of attack signatures, matching traffic against predefined signatures—if 
a match occurs, the system raises the alarm of a possible attack. This approach has 
limitations in detecting zero-day attacks, for which there are no signatures in the 
database. The anomaly-detection approach utilises various methods, including statistical 
and machine learning algorithms, to detect threats. Given that this approach does not 
require pre-knowledge of threats, it can identify zero-day attacks; however, it 
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commonly produces a high rate of false-positive and false-negative alarms, limiting its 
industrial applicability. In this thesis, we proposed a framework for network anomaly 
detection based on recent advances in machine learning, specifically DL. 
For the solution domain, this thesis proposed a novel threat detection framework based 
on unsupervised DL algorithms to classify network threats as anomalies. The 
framework consisted of two phases: a DL algorithm and clustering algorithms (either k-
means or mean shift). The DL algorithm represented a pre-training phase, which 
simplified the input to the clustering algorithm. The framework was focused on 
dimensionality reduction by compressing the dimensions of the input data to a single 
value, simplifying and improving the performance of the clustering algorithm during the 
second phase. 
Dimensionality reduction involved reducing the entire input record to a single value, the 
reconstruction error. In other applications of USDL, dimensionality reduction involves 
using the encoded layer as a reduced representation of the data and reducing the 
dimensionality of data to improve the separation of samples into clusters. However, the 
use of autoencoders for dimensionality reduction is limited because they are prone to 
exaggerated reductions, negatively affecting model predictions and reducing 
generalisation. Notably, the approach presented in this thesis reduced the dimensions of 
the data to a single value, which could be clustered using a fast algorithm such as k-
means rather than using expensive computational algorithms, leading to improved 
performance. 
The use of the DL algorithm in the pre-training phase contributed to solving the curse of 
dimensionality related to k-means, which is based on calculating distances between 
samples—as the number of samples increases, the distance between them reduces. The 
framework solved this problem by reducing the number of inputs based on a key 
procedure using autoencoders and RBMs, resulting in more straightforward inputs being 
forwarded to the k-means. The framework is based on two unsupervised algorithms, 
meaning it can find patterns in data with no previous labelling. Hence, this approach 
may be used to detect zero-day attacks. 
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Further, the study provided a comparative evaluation between a generative energy-
based model (RBM) and a non-probabilistic algorithm (autoencoder). Implementation 
of the proposed framework design was done using TensorFlow. 
DL has achieved unparalleled results in image, speech, signal, text and natural language 
processing applications. Network anomaly detection is an area in which DL can 
improve detection precision. However, research in this area is limited. In this thesis, we 
proposed a semi-supervised DL-based detection framework for discovering network 
abnormalities. 
The framework employed USDL for the first phase and a simpler algorithm, k-means or 
mean shift, for the second phase. Additionally, we experimentally demonstrated the 
prediction accuracy of the main USDL algorithms (i.e. autoencoders and RBMs). 
Simulation of several scenarios was conducted using the KDD99 network dataset. 
During many executions over several testing cycles, data were collected and statistically 
analysed. We used TensorFlow as the DL development library. As the name indicates, 
TensorFlow expresses matrix flows in a graph model. A TensorFlow graph includes 
nodes and edges, with nodes representing mathematical operations and edges 
representing multidimensional data arrays (or tensors). 
The first stage of the experiment involved building the autoencoder network. The 
autoencoder consisted of two passes—the encoder and the decoder—both of which 
comprise multiple layers. The dataset (41 training samples) was loaded into 
TensorFlow’s tensor dimension. Weight and bias tensors were created for the encoder 
and decoder. The dimensions of weights and biases depended on the number of neurons 
(or units in the hidden layer). For example, if the input was decoded into five units, this 
meant that there would be (41, 5) tensors, with 41 representing some input units 
(features of one network traffic record) plus 41 biases. The same dimensions were used 
for the decoder. The second step was to train the network. In the forward pass, logits 
were used as the activation function, which reconstructed records from the decoded 
units, weights and biases for the output. The third step was to compare the original data 
against the reconstructed output. A cost function, such as the squared error function was 
used to compute data loss. The fourth step was to minimise the cost (in this case, data 
loss). Several optimisation algorithms, including Adam optimisers, were used to 
 150 
minimise loss or reconstruction rate. Once the network had settled after various sweeps 
of the data chunks (batches), the second phase of testing was conducted. During the 
testing, we fed the network with the testing samples to attempt to reconstruct the data. 
A systematic analysis using confusion matrices was conducted to evaluate results and 
compare them with those of other related works. The simulation showed a significant 
accuracy of ≈99% for the integration of the autoencoder and k-means clustering 
algorithm. 
Given that the use of DL in IDS reduces data dimensionality and the number of features 
in network traffic data, we recommend that further investigations be conducted into the 
application of DL in IDS. 
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